# SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research Volume 5, Parts 1 & 2 (Spring & Autumn 2007)

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#### **OBITUARY**

# Dr. U HLA PE (1913-2007)

Dr. U Hla Pe, Emeritus Professor of Burmese in the University of London, died peacefully at his home in Moulmein (Mawlamyine), Burma, on 31 July 2007. He was 94 years old. Saya Hla Pe worked in or for School of Oriental and African Studies for 41 of those years, before retiring to live in Burma in 1980. He wrote numerous articles, gave many talks both at SOAS and elsewhere, and taught a succession of devoted students. His most substantial publications are Konmara Pya Zat, vol 1, Introduction and translation (London 1952), which is a study of Burmese dramatic literature in the 1870s, and the six fascicules of the unfinished Burmese-English dictionary (London, 1941-1981).

Saya Hla Pe, the son of a Burmese traditional doctor, was born in 1913 in the village of Khare, near Moulmein, where he was brought up by four spinster aunts. His reverence for scholarship was demonstrated at an early age: as a toddler he was seen making obeisance to a book he had accidentally trodden on. He progressed from the village school to high school in Moulmein, thence to a BA in Burmese language and literature at the University of Rangoon, and on to take an MA, achieving honours and distinctions as he went.

In 1938 he received a state scholarship to attend the Institute of Education in London, where he gained a Diploma in Teaching. At this stage he met Dr. J. A. Stewart, Professor of Burmese at SOAS, who recognised Saya's talent and commitment to Burmese literature, and persuaded him to abandon his plans for further studies in education, and to join him at SOAS instead. During the war years Saya did the research work for his thesis, part of which was later published as the Konmara Pya Zat; assisted Dr. Stewart and C. W. Dunn with the compilation of the Burmese-English dictionary; and worked occasionally as a translator and announcer for the BBC's Burmese language service.

From these beginnings, Saya established a niche in SOAS. He was appointed to the Panel of Additional Lecturers in May 1946, and appointed Lecturer in Burmese in 1948. The files have a letter from Dr. Stewart urging the School to snap up Maung Hla Pe before

Rangoon University lured him back. Saya was made Reader in Burmese in 1954, and Professor in 1966. On his retirement in 1980 he moved back to Burma, where he continued to contribute articles on Burmese language and literature to Burmese journals, as well as pieces on life abroad and how to succeed. His book-length publications include Burmese proverbs (London 1962), a selection with observations on the light proverbs throw on Burmese life; Myanma-sa-pe e-gan sa-dan ("Introduction to Burmese literature", Rangoon and Mandalay 1966, reprinted 1969 and 1980), a series of essays; Burma: literature, historiography, scholarship, language, life and Buddhism (ISEAS 1985), a collection of talks given to schools and other audiences; and Wiriyago htu, nyan-hnint chu, kan-ga hpe-ma-thu ("Thanks to application, brains and luck" Rangoon 2001), an autobiography. Two companion volumes of the Konmara Pya Zat (notes on the text, and the full text) were prepared but not published.

Progress on the Burmese-English dictionary was high on Saya's list of priorities. This ambitious project, to compile a dictionary as detailed and authoritative as the OED, was launched in Rangoon in 1924. It underwent several changes of funding, location and personnel, and was eventually taken over by SOAS. When Saya first became an assistant to Stewart and Dunn the dictionary project was housed in a purpose-built office in the garden of Dr. Stewart in Bishop's Stortford. Over time, Saya rose from being a part-time assistant to principal editor.

This was in the days before computer programs for lexicographers, and the process of compilation was traditional and laborious. Saya and his fellow editors had access to a collection of over 400,000 index cards, amassed before the project was moved to England with the then editors Stewart and Dunn on their retirement from government service in colonial Burma. Each card bore an entry word, a quotation and reference to a source text, and some indication of the way the word was used. Editing entailed sorting all the cards for the same entry, deciding how many meanings or sub-meanings the entry should have, adding one's own observations, and then choosing appropriate English glosses, and selecting and translating illustrative quotations. This stage was followed by typing out the draft, sending it to the printers -- who didn't read Burmese script but were able (mostly) to relate its characters to the numbers on the matrix – correcting proofs, and checking the corrections.

Saya and his colleagues naturally had other duties at SOAS and it is not surprising that the dictionary made slow progress. When Saya decided to retire in 1980, the dictionary had just reached the end of the entries beginning with the prefix A-, about a sixth of the total entries. It was clear that an undertaking of this magnitude was only feasible with far greater manpower than two or three part-time editors, and it was agreed that with the retirement of Saya Hla Pe, the end of the A- entries was a suitable point at which to bring work on the dictionary to an end. Although the grand project was never fully realised the work completed up to that point does cover a discrete segment of the Burmese lexicon, and the scholarship that went into drafting its entries will be a resource for many years to come.

One of Saya's referees for his scholarship to come to London was written by the historian G. H. Luce. In it, he describes the young Hla Pe as having an "exceptional charm of manner and a modest unselfish character." Saya retained these characteristics throughout his life. He was much loved by his colleagues and friends, from the UK, from Burma and from other European centres. He was invited to speak at schools all over the UK, and at universities in England, France and Germany. Saya was always deeply aware of his debt to Stewart and Dunn. He had promised each of them before they died that he would continue work on the dictionary for as long as he was able, and he kept his promise. It is perhaps thanks to their guidance and encouragement that Saya succeeded in stepping beyond the traditional Burmese reverence for authority with which he had been brought up. He felt strongly about erroneous ideas that were passed down uncritically from one generation of teachers to another and took great delight in pointing out, both in his writings and his teaching, where these ideas were wrong. He used to recount with glee how at one meeting of respected scholars in Burma, people were claiming Pali origins for various Burmese words, purely on the strength of their looking alike. Saya was so appalled by this unscientific approach to etymology that he solemnly proposed to regard Burmese ani "near" and awe "far off" as being derived from the English near and away -- a suggestion so preposterous that he hoped it would encourage the venerable pundits to re-examine the grounds for their claims.

For many years Saya lived the life of a confirmed bachelor, happily looked after by a pair of devoted spinster sisters, an echo of his early

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upbringing. When the two sisters died, Saya's friends and family in Burma decided he needed a wife, and so it was that Daw Than Mya, like Saya a resident of Moulmein, was approached and brought to England. Saya wanted to go and fetch her himself, but at the time there was a ban on visits to Burma by Burmans who had taken a different nationality. They lived for many years in Welwyn Garden City, and when Saya retired they moved together to Moulmein, where Daw Than Mya survives him.

Saya was a cheerful companion, with a boyish sense of humour. He found time for everyone who needed his advice or his company. He was proud of his house and carefully tended garden in Welwyn Garden City, and often invited students, colleagues and friends to visit him there. During the years of his retirement too, he gave a warm welcome to visitors, both Burmese scholars who came to pay their respects, and colleagues and admirers from abroad.

To add a personal note, I record with gratitude the unstinting help Saya provided in the early days of my learning the language, and the numerous helpful introductions he gave me for my first trip to Burma. I still use his anecdotes in my own teaching, and I mourn his passing.

John Okell, with input from Patrica Herbert and Anna Allott.

# Samuhadda Vicchedani An Overlooked Source on the Dhammathats

# **Andrew Huxley**

In 1874 the Burma Herald Press published Samuhaddha Vicchedani. This Pali title means "Decisions on the Whole Law." The work has a Burmese subtitle Myanma taya lan dhammathat kyam which means "The Dhammathat book that is a Pathway to Burmese Law" or (if we translate taya lan as "legal principles") "The Principles of Burmese Law Dhammathat book." It consists of 314 pages of Burmese text, within which extracts from sixteen dhammathats are divided into eighteen topical Chapters. The final chapter, for example, deals with the topic of Debt and gives extracts from nine dhammathats about interest rates, sureties, refinancing, and bankruptcy. Daw Than Saw's translation of that Chapter follows this introduction. Samuhadda Vicchedani is an important source on Burmese legal history, which has been too long ignored. Ryuji Okudaira (in 1979) and I (in 1997) both omitted it from our bibliographies of Burmese law.2 In fact no 20th century source makes mentions of it, though it was always on the shelves of European and American research libraries.

When the Emperor Justinian developed the technique of preserving legal materials from different texts by arranging them in topical chapters, he named the genre "Digest." *Samuhaddha Vicchedani* is a Digest of Burma's palm leaf manuscript dhammathat literature. It appeared twenty years before *Kinwun Mingyi's Digest*, its better-known counterpart.<sup>3</sup> It includes extracts from sixteen dhammathats, while

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> W. DeCourcy Ireland, *Samuhaddha Vicchedani* (Rangoon: Burma Herald Press, 1874).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ryuji Okudaira, "An Outline of the Origin, Development and Research on the Dhammathats" [main article in Japanese], *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu* [South East Asian Studies] 17 (1979): 99-130; Andrew Huxley, "Studying Theravada Legal Literature," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 20 (1997): 63-91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Kinwun Mingyi [at the instance and under the authority of G. D. Burgess,

Kinwun Mingyi uses thirty-three. *Samuhadda Vicchedani*, however, quotes from dhammathats such as *Atitya* and *King Jali* that Kinwun Mingyi did not own. The earlier Digest lacks what the later Digest has - the convenience of a full English translation.<sup>4</sup> Daw Than Saw's translation begins to redress that lack.

A more important reason to welcome the reemergence of *Samuhadda Vicchedani* is that it covers the whole range of Burmese Law. The eighteen Chapter headings of *Samuhadda Vicchedani*<sup>5</sup> are as follows:

- 0 On the Dhammathats
- 1 Judicial best practice
- 2 On dividing inheritance
- 3 Marriage
- 4 Law on divorce
- 5 "Adultery" by unmarried couple
- 6 Adultery by married couples
- 7 Law on commerce
- 8 Law on pawning
- 9 Law on land ownership
- 10 Law on saying too much
- 11 Law on assault
- 12 Law on accusation
- 13 Law on contracts
- 14 On hired labour
- 15 On giving
- 16 Law on handing over to another
- 17 Law on loans and Interest

Kinwun Mingyi's Digest covers only the topics of Samuhadda

Judicial Commissioner, Upper Burma], A Digest of the Burmese Buddhist Law concerning Inheritance and Marriage being a Collection of Texts from Thirty-Six Dhammathats, 2 vols. (Rangoon: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1898-1899).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Kinwun Mingyi, Translation of a Digest of the Burmese Buddhist Law concerning Marriage and Inheritance, being a Collection of Texts from Thirty Six Dhammathats, 2 vols. (Rangoon: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1902, 1910).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> My thanks to John Okell for translating *Samuhadda Vicchedani*'s front matter and to Daw Than Saw for translating its final Chapter.

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Vicchedani's Chapters Two to Five. Kinwun Mingyi's Digest contains no rules about Contract, Tort, Land Law, Debt, Charity, Employment Law, or all those other topics which the British intended to replace with their Anglo-Indian Statutory Codes. If a historian of Burma wished to trace the precolonial development of Burma's credit market. Kinwun Mingyi's Digest is of no avail, but Samuhadda Vicchedani offers twenty-one pages on the topic, which has been extracted from dhammathats written in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The circumstances in which Samuhadda Vicchedani was written and published mark a watershed in the nineteenth century historiography of Burmese law. For a brief period in the 1870s, Burmese and English, from above and below the border, cooperated to transmit Burmese literature from palm leaf to printed book. This "Rangoon renaissance," as I call it, was particularly interested in Burmese legal literature. In the final part of this paper I shall argue that the beginning of the end of the Rangoon renaissance occurred on 23 January 1874. I start with the basic question: who wrote Samuhadda Vicchedani?

#### 1. Who wrote it?

British Burma's Register of Books Printed in 1874 names W. DeCourcy Ireland as author, and Mr. H. Ahee, the Sino-Burman proprietor of the Burma Herald Press, as copyright holder of Samuhadda Vicchedani.<sup>6</sup> Certainly Ireland wrote the three page English language "Preface," but this portrays him more as the book's guiding spirit and editor, than as its actual author:

I have undertaken the office of bringing this work before the public with diffidence and some reluctance. Even a cursory revision of a text, laboriously collated from Palm-leaf MSS. is no easy task ... [p. iii]

If it was Ireland who brought the work before the public, who undertook the laborious collation of the Burmese text from palm-leaf mss.? And who wrote the Burmese language Preface, and the introductory chapter "On the Dhammathats," which follows it?

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Euan Bagshawe, personal communication 27 October 2003

Circumstantial evidence suggests that it was U Thadoway of Akyab (1828-c1895), who spent most of his life working for the British Government in Arakan and who served directly under DeCourcy Ireland (1835-1902). Samuhadda Vicchedani was a collaboration between the thirty-nine year old Irish Assistant Commissioner and the forty-six year old Arakanese Extra Assistant Commissioner. Is it the kind of colonial scholarship that we can trust? Or was Thadoway a collaborator in the perjorative sense, by which I mean a Burmese middleman who wrote only what the English wanted to hear? In the final section I shall argue that Thadoway and Ireland, along with other members of the Rangoon renaissance, were the last trustworthy authors on law before the deluge. Treat with great care anything written between 1880 (when Em Forchhammer wrote his first account of Burmese law) and 1942 (when John Furnivall challenged the eternal verities of Burmese legal history). Samuhadda Vicchedan's special importance is that it is the earliest printed account of Burmese law written by a Burmese. Three years later another pillar of the Rangoon renaissance published a second such account in English. I have discussed U Kyaw Htun's Sandford Prize Essay elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> These two works share an insider point of view, since their authors spent their working life as Burmese judges, who listened to argument from the she-ne, the traditional Burmese legal profession, and who used the dhammathats as their sources of law. However Thadoway and Kyaw Htun were also outsiders, in that they were paid by the Rangoon Government, not the Mandalay Government of King Mindon.

DeCourcy Ireland's family owned estates in County Kildare, town houses in Dublin, and sent their boys to Trinity College, Dublin: in short they belonged to the Irish ascendancy. DeCourcy never knew his father, who had died in the year of his birth. He was educated at Kilkenney College and Trinity, from which he graduated B.A. in 1858.<sup>8</sup> The following year he turned up in the Province of British Burma, and took a very lowly job as the Commissioner of Pegu's accountant. Though manifestly a gentleman, DeCourcy Ireland allowed himself to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Andrew Huxley, "Rajadhamma confronts *Leviathan*: Burmese Political Theory in the 1870s," in Ian Harris (ed.), *Buddhism, Power and Political Order* (London: Routledge, 2007): 26-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> My thanks to Estelle Gittins, College Archives, Trinity College Dublin, for this information from *Alumni Dublinenses*.

employed as a member of the Uncovenanted Civil Service - a mistake that was to haunt him for the rest of his career. The "covenant" in question is the promise signed by the higher grades of the Indian Civil Service to reimburse their employers for any liability they incur. The promise was not as important as the financial deposit that accompanied it. A Covenanted Civil Servant had capital at his disposal. He would think of himself as a gentlemen, and of his Uncovenanted colleagues as socially inferior.9 What misfortune or whim was it that drove Ireland from a comfortable life in Dublin to become one of Empire's ancillary workers in Burma? His grandchildren and grandnephews have preserved oral accounts of an ancestor who had to leave Dublin in a hurry, suspected of involvement with the "Young Irish" movement. To make matters worse, he had been caught climbing from his girlfriend's bedroom window in the early hours.<sup>10</sup> If this ancestor were DeCourcy Ireland, it would explain his sudden departure from Dublin, and his scrabble for any kind of job in a far away country.

Within two years of arriving in British Burma, Ireland had been promoted to Extra Assistant Commissioner of Toungoo. Chief Commissioner Arthur Phayre, who had a reputation for recruiting in unorthodox places, promised Ireland that his Uncovenanted status would not be a bar to future promotion. However, his successors found it increasingly hard to persuade Calcutta to stretch its rules to accomodate Phayre's promises. By 1867 Ireland had reached the rank of Assistant Commissioner, the glass ceiling for Uncovenanted officers. He was thirty-two, and would go no further up the ladder unless he devised a strategy to break through that ceiling. His colleagues in Burma would not treat him as a gentleman? Very well. He already had a B.A., so was better educated than most of them. Were he to acquire a Doctorate of Laws, they could not but promote him. He spent his first long leave in Dublin and Galway, where he reached an understanding with Trinity College Dublin as to what publications on Burmese law would merit the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ashley Eden plaintively addressed Calcutta soon after his arrival in Burma: "I am two men short in the commission ... Can you send me some active gentlemenlike men, not uncovenanted?" P3/261 October Routine Index, telegram of 16 September 1872. References in this form are to the Burma Home Papers held by the India Office Library, London.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> My thanks to the late John De Courcy-Ireland of Dalkey, and to David de Courcy-Ireland of Ucel, for sharing their family history.

award of an LL.D. In 1869 he published *Ac: Ubademya koi*, containing his Burmese translations of Anglo-Indian legislation.<sup>11</sup> In 1874 he published *Samuhadda Vicchedani*, his Digest of the dhammathats. In 1878 Trinity College Dublin awarded him an honorary LL.D. and LL.B. Subsequently he was promoted far beyond the glass ceiling: as acting Inspector-General of Police in 1882 and as Commissioner in 1887 - the only Uncovenanted Officer ever to reach that eminence.<sup>12</sup>

U Thadoway started working for the British government in Arakan at the age of thirty-five. By thirty-eight he was Extra Assistant Commissioner 3rd class, 1st grade (earning Rs.150 per month). In 1867 he was promoted to 2nd class, 4th grade, given a Rs.50 raise and sent down to the quiet port of Sandoway in Southern Arakan, where Ireland was his immediate superior. After three years Ireland returned to Akyab to run its English speaking first court. Immediately after Ireland finished Ubademya koi, and turned his attention to the Digest, Thadoway was transferred to Akyab to run the Burmese-speaking second court, and to take over Ireland's caseload whenever the Assistant Commissioner was out of town conducting inspections. Thadoway retired from government service in Arakan in 1886 at the age of fifty-eight. I have found no trace of him in the archives after that: I assume he died during the 1890s. Other British Officers made similar partnerships with their Burmese Extra Assistant Commissioners. 13 As Ireland's subordinate colleague, Thadoway had both opportunity and motive to compile Samuhadda Vicchedani. Ireland once indicated that he and Thadoway were in the habit of discussing Burmese legal topics together. 14 And - a final piece of circumstantial evidence for Thadoway's authorship - Ireland described

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> W. DeCourcy Ireland, Ac. Ubademya koi (Akyab: printer unknown, 1869).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Herbert Thirkell White, *A Civil Servant in Burma* (London: Edward Arnold, 1913): p42

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In Thayetmyo Horace Browne joined forces with E.A.C. Maung Tetto to write about Burmese law and history. Arthur Phayre may have had a similar relationship with Kyaw Htun (E.A.C. Danubyu).

<sup>14</sup> Ireland's comments are in P/1986 B March 1883 64 General. Thadoway appears in the archives variously as "Moung Thadoway," "Moung Thadowe," and "Moung Thadwe." When U Thadoway reached the age of fifty-five, he was allowed to postpone his retirement for three years. This was just after Horace Browne's application to do likewise had been turned down: P/2882 B February 1887 22

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him as "a judge of the old Burmese regime" whose "antiquated court" was "designed mainly to meet cases of Burmese law and custom arising amongst the large population of Burmese." Because of his "total want of knowledge of the English language" his judgements showed a "garbled notion" of the English law of Contract "more mischievious than useful." In other words, he was faithful to traditional Burmese law, which is an excellent qualification for making a Digest of the dhammathats. An accurate title page for *Samuhadda Vicchedani* should, in my view, read:

#### DECISIONS ON THE WHOLE LAW

A compendium showing the Path to Burmese law Compiled by U Thadoway from dhammathat texts in his possession Under the supervision of W. DeCourcy Ireland, B.A. With a Preface by W. DeCourcy Ireland, B.A.

#### 2. How does it treat its source material?

In his Preface Ireland admits that he has not given an accurate reproduction of what was written in the palm leaf. He has left out the Pali technical terms "wherever a Burmese equivalent could be found" so as to make his Digest "more readily available to those who are not advanced in such Pali scholarship as we find clothed in Burmese guise." In addition, he admits to shortening the Burmese text of the extracts that he prints: "The full text will have to be sought in the Palm-leaf Mss." since no publisher would agree "to print the text in extenso." The extent of his shortening was drastic. Here are two examples comparing the Samuhadda Vicchedani extracts from Manugye with Richardson's bilingual edition of Manugye (which Daw Than Saw and I henceforth cite in the form: Manu 3:40.) Samuhadda Vicchedani s.629 on the twelve types of sureties "reproduces" Manu 3:56. The Digest gives a mere five lines of text, while the dhammathat gives more than a page. S.631 on the nine types of debtor who should not be put in the stocks is an even more radical abridgement of Manu 3:44. The dhammathat covers most of two

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> V/24/2232 Criminal and Civil Justice Reports for 1870. per DeCourcy ireland

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ireland, Samuhaddha Vicchedani, iii.

pages, while the Digest uses less than fifty words.

While Ireland dictated the overall policy for the book, and negotiated with publishers, it was Thadoway who copied out extracts from his palm leaf manuscript collection, and somehow arranged them into a top copy from which the Burma Herald Press could pull its proofs. The Burmese text mainly reflects Thadoway's legal judgement, and this is particularly true of its first two sections. The "Introductory Preface" deals with the history of the Burmese dhammathats. He looks in depth at the history of a single dhammathat, quoting it verbatim for his first seven sections, 17 then adding in his own voice information about other important dhammathats, and an explanation of what Samuhadda Vicchedani means. Then follows his Chapter "About the Dhammathats," where he addresses the breadth of the tradition. Here Thadoway lists thirty-three law-texts by name, adding some information on authors, dates, and place of writing. He ends his introductory material by identifying the three most authoritative dhammathats in the Burmese tradition. These twelve pages contain his portrayal of Burmese law.

Thadoway starts his history at the dawn of time when King Mahasammata was elected to rule over men. Mahasammata had a wise minister called Manu, who sat as a judge on seven consecutive days and decreed his famous seven judgements. In those days wise men knew how to project themselves through the universe while in deep meditation. At various times these sages brought back the texts of the first three dhammathats called *Manusara*, *Manosara* and *Manussika* ("Essence of Manu," "Essence of Mano," "Of Things Human"). *Manusara* was reedited first by one of the Pyu Kings (c700), then by a Mon King (c1450), then in the 1630s by King Thalun the Just, and fourthly in 1769 by Myat Aung. All this information has, in fact, been conveyed by a long extract from Myat Aung's preface to his 1769 edition. Thadoway has borrowed it to suggest that Burmese legal history goes back 1,100 years to the Pyu cities of the first millenium, and through them back to the beginnings of human social origins, personified in Mahasammata. He means that

Only six paragraphs in does it become clear that the words we have been reading were composed a hundred years before: "I the High Headman and

reading were composed a hundred years before: "I, the High Headman and bearer of the extended title *Wunna-dhamma Kyawdin*, have compiled a new nissaya of the *Manusara Shwe-myin Dhammathat* ... in the year s.1131 [CE 1769]."

Burmese law has its roots in the wider civilisation of Pali Buddhism.<sup>18</sup> Turning to the local history of the Irrawaddy valley, he lists thirty-three dhammathats in the Burmese tradition. Burmese legal history delights in such lists: the point is to break them down into their sub-components. Thadoway's list of thirty-three is constructed from three sub-lists. He starts by reproducing a common list of ten early dhammathats from Upper Burma. His next ten dhammathats are associated with Lower Burma. The final thirteen are an eclectic mix, perhaps compiled by Thadoway himself, which include One Shoulder and Two Shoulder works, dhammathat and pyatton, texts composed by royal command and those written for sheer joy in exposition.

Thadoway's chapter on the dhammathats ends by ranking the three most authoritative dhammathats in order. Top of the list is *Kozaungkyop*, the compendium of nine dhammathats written in the 1580s under King Hsinbyushin of the Toungoo dynasty.<sup>19</sup> Next comes *Manusara Shwe-myin* written in the 1630s (Restored Toungoo dynasty), and thirdly *Manuwunnana* written in the 1770s (Konbaung dynasty). Thadoway portrays the Burmese legal tradition as being at least fifteen centuries old, and as deriving from Buddhist sources. Thadoway's final Chapter shows a preference for starting each topic or subtopic with citations from *Kozaungkyop*. It also displays some tendencies to subtopical organisation with his first section covering the basics of Debt and his second dealing with sureties for most of its length. But if there is any pattern which explains exactly how Thadoway has ordered his material in this Chapter, I have not been able to spot it.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Vide Steven Collins and Andrew Huxley, "The Post-canonical Adventures of Mahasammata," Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 623-45.

He refers to it alternately as Kozaungkyop and Kozaunganyi. (Cf Ireland Samuhaddha Vicchedani, 3 with Ireland, Samuhaddha Vicchedani, 5). Almost certainly he is referring to the same work, a fact underlined by the overlap between Forchhammer's summary of Kozaungkyop on debt and Samuhadda Vicchedani's extracts from the same. Emanuel Forchhammer, Jardine Prize: An Essay on the Sources and Development of Burmese Law from the Era of the First Introduction of the Indian Law to the Time of the British Occupation of Pegu (Rangoon: Government Press, 1885): pp. 67-84. Note, however, that Samuhadda Vichedani s.643 and s652-3 do not appear in Forchhammer's summary.

# 3. It marks the beginning of the end of the Rangoon renaissance

Ireland and Thadoway expected the Rangoon Government to look favourably on Samuhadda Vicchedani. But the Chief Commissioner was critical of it, and refused any official support. This unexpected reaction requires an explanation. In this section I argue that its publication marks the collision between Calcutta's determination to remodel Burma on Indian lines, and the Rangoon renaissance's rediscovery of Burma's culture. The pressure to standardise Burmese law along Anglo-Indian lines came from Fitzjames Stephen, the stern utilitarian Law Member on the Governor-General's Council. In 1871 Stephen circulated a minute requiring that all of British India's territories should progress towards adopting standardised Anglo-Indian law. He recommended that a Judicial Commissioner of British Burma be appointed with the twin task of publishing the native law and implementing the Anglo-Indian codes. Douglas Sandford was appointed to the post in January 1872. In October Sandford announced a scheme to collect palm leaf mss. of dhammathats with a view to publication. He circulated details to British Burma's European officials and, at the Chief Commissioner's suggestion, to those few Extra Assistant Commissioners who could speak reasonable English.<sup>20</sup> Ireland and Thadoway read the circular with mixed feelings. On the one hand the Government had spotted the necessity of the work which they already had in hand. On the other hand, the circular had alerted potential rivals. It alerted men such as U Kyaw Htun, Extra Assistant Commissioner at Danubyu and Maung Tetto, Extra Assistant Commissioner at Thayetmyo to Rangoon's sudden interest in Burmese law. Ireland and Thadoway had several months lead over their rivals: they must work as fast as possible to ensure they were not overtaken.

The Rangoon renaissance of the early 1870s was a homegrown movement, which started when the Burmese acquired printing presses independent of Government and the missionaries. Their first priority was to shift the Burmese tradition from palm leaf to print. A good example of this is Kyaw Htun's *Pakinnaka Dipani kyam* ("Explanatory Treatise on Miscellaneous Topics"), which summarised Burmese history and literary culture, and contrasted it with British history and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> P3/37 October 1872, Sandford to Eden; P3/38 October 1872, Eden to Sandford.

institutions.<sup>21</sup> Most of the early native press books dealt with law: between 1869 and 1873 two dhammathats and one collection of pyattons (legal precedents) appeared. Though the presses at first were located in Rangoon, Mandalay took a close interest in the movement. The native press edition of *Maharajathat* (1870) thanks King Mindon for his assistance in providing palm leaf mss. Mindon's Minister with legal expertise, Kinwun Mingyi, met many of the leading figures in the movement. Kyaw Htun gave him a copy of *Pakinnaka* to take to Mandalay. He also talked to U Oun and Maung Gyi, two other employees of British Burma who were experimenting in writing about legal topics.<sup>22</sup>

The English were also part of the "Rangoon renaissance" if we widen the phrase to denote the brief period of optimism that Calcutta would allow them funds to establish universities, law schools, and museums. Rangoon's Government House, a commodious brick building costing Rs. 1,900,000, opened for business in 1872. The two most important officals to move into it were the Chief Commissioner Ashley Eden and the Judicial Commissioner Douglas Sandford. They were both Rugby men, imbued with Thomas Arnold's ideal of the Muscular Christian Who Fulfills his Duty to God and Queen. Their duty in Burma, as they saw it, was to educate the Burmese about science, technology and trade, while educating the rest of the world in Burmese culture. To this end they submitted many an expensive scheme to Calcutta. By 1876 they had come to realise that Calcutta would not pay for the improvement and modernisation of British Burma. Eden and Sandford returned to India proper, where money was available for the kind of achievements that enhanced reputations within the India Civil Service.

Sandford, an admirably objective scholar, looked on King Mindon as an ally in the project to publish Burmese law. Alerted by *Samuhadda Vicchedani*'s reference to *Kozaungkyop* as the most authoritative of the dhammathats, Sandford wrote to Mandalay to ask for a copy, and King

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> U Kyaw Htun, *Pakinnaka dipani kyam* (Rangoon: Gezet Pon-hneik-taik, 1873). <sup>22</sup> Michael W. Charney, *Powerful Learning: Buddhist literati and the Throne in Burma's Last Dynasty, 1752-1885* (Ann Arbor: Centers for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 2006): p. 225, 227. U Oun's translation of English legislation into Burmese was called *Tayama Ubadei*. Maung Gyi's two books were about the dhammathats.

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Mindon had his scribes run one off.<sup>23</sup> Sandford's only fault as a scholar was his inability to read or speak Burmese. Extraordinary as it might seem, Sandford had spent two years searching for dhammathat texts before he discovered that the Burma Herald Press had already printed two of them in full. As soon as he discovered, he wrote to Eden asking whether the Government should buy copies to distribute to the Extra Assistant Commissioners. Would the Chief Commissioner be so kind as to shed "light on what authority *Maharajathat* has?" Eden slapped him down:

This work contains Answers by Kaingza Manu to King Thalun's questions. It is of authority among the Burmese. The 1870 edition was not printed at the invitation or with the assistance of Government, and no copies were subscribed for. The Chief Commissioner sees no objection to distributing it, but would advise that [Richardson's Manugye] has been the recognised authority on Burmese law ever since we occupied the Province, and it should still be maintained as the guide to the courts on all points of Burmese law.<sup>24</sup>

Unable to speak Burmese, Sandford was putty in the hands of any missionary or civil servant who could. He strove to create an intellectual partnership between Mandalay and Rangoon, but the old Burma hands could always rebuff him by claiming a deeper knowledge. The same fate befell Sandford's contemporary John Nesfield, the Director of Public Instruction. One of the lasting results of the Rangoon renaissance arose from Nesfield's suggestion to Eden that the Government make a systematic collection of palm leaf mss., following the example "lately put into effect in Ceylon." He warned that this would require expenditure on a resident Pali scholar "to be employed as curator and general editor." Nesfield's initial suggestion was to hire a Pali scholar from Upper Burma, but he was dissuaded by the missionary lobby: "Having talked to Mason, Bigandet and Rev. Mr. Chard, it is clear to me ... that a professor from Mandalay would be worse than none." The Government should

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> P7/69 24 September 1874, Sandford to British Resident Mandalay; P7/72 6 November 1874, British Resident Mandalay to Sandford.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> P7/37 April 1875, Sandford to Eden; P7/40 April 1875 Eden to Sandford.

recruit in Germany "where Sanskrit and Pali scholarship is advanced and ... a clever young scholar ... would embrace an opportunity of seeing the East on Rs.300 a month."<sup>25</sup>

Ashley Eden had no room in his vision of learning about Burmese law and culture for any partnership with Mandalay. Evidently he felt that Rangoon should not display any cultural cringe towards a King with whom Rangoon might soon be at war. He should, therefore, have welcomed *Samuhadda Vicchedani*, written by an Irishman and an Arakanese, both of whom were impeccably loyal to the Queen-Empress. Here was a Burmese judge of the old school, who knew his way round the dhammathats, in partnership with a Trinity College graduate who had already published in the field of law. What better team to describe Burmese law as the Burmese lawyers practised it before Burmese judges? In high expectation, Mr. Ahee wrote to Eden enclosing the first half of the book in proof. He mentioned Ireland's opinion that it would "form a most useful handbook for the Burmese officials" and offered "100-200 copies at the special price of Rs.4 per copy." Eden sought advice from his two advisers on Burmese culture. Horace Browne replied that:

The work has such grave faults that in my opinion ... if the work were published, the government should warn officials that it should not be taken as a guide in Civil Cases.<sup>27</sup>

W. Hadfield, the Government Translator thought it "entirely out of the question to put such a book in the hands of *myo-ok* as a guide, as it would only confuse and mislead them." The Chief Commissioner declined Mr. Ahee's offer, summing up the advice he received in these words: "It is represented to Mr Eden that in some places the work is at variance with the existing law administered by the courts."

As an example of state repression, this hardly compares with banning the book, or with punishing the author.<sup>30</sup> Ireland and Thadoway

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> P5/174, November 1873, Nesfield to Eden.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> P5/127, Ahee to Eden 15 November 1873

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> P5/129, Browne to Eden, 5 January 1874

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> P5/128 Hadford to Eden 5 November 1973

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> P5/130 Eden's secretary to Ahee, 23 January 1874

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Perhaps Eden would have been more receptive if he had been told about the

simply had their request for state subsidy refused. I doubt that either of them, as opposed to Mr. Ahee, lost money due to Eden's decision. None the less it is a curious episode. What, in Rangoon's eyes, was the fault with Samuhadda Vicchedani? Some of Browne's and Hadford's criticisms were unfair. The function of a Digest is to offer views on the same topic from different source. A Digest that is self-consistent is not doing its job properly, so Hadford's criticism that two successive extracts on p. 78 of the proofs disagree with each other missed the point. And when Browne argued that "In some cases ... his exposition of laws is diametrically opposed to the well-known written and customary law of the country" he meant that some of the extracts in Samuhadda Vicchedani disagreed with rules laid down in Richardson's Manugye. 31 But if Manugye was to be taken as deciding every controversial question in Burmese law for all time, why publish any more law texts? Browne was on more solid ground in criticising Ireland's policy of excluding Pali terms. He spoke of the Pali elements in the dhammathats as crucial to the understanding of these "old writings." Browne, who knew some Pali, flagged Ireland's ignorance of the language as a serious fault in his approach to Burmese law. Browne's casual put-down had ramifications during the 1880s. John Jardine (Sandford's successor as Judicial Commissioner) declared that in studying dhammathat and rajathat "I am convinced that the Pali scholar ought to have preceded the Judge."32 And Emanuel Forchhammer, who knew Pali but had only a rudimentary knowledge of Burmese, came to be regarded as the ultimate expert on Burmese law. Forchhammer and Jardine rejected the main conclusions of Thadoway and Kyaw Htun. According to the Rangoon renaissance, Burmese law was ancient and Buddhist. According to Forchhammer and Jardine, it was less than two centuries old, and was based on the Sanskrit dharmasastras.

Eden's real objection to Samuhadda Vicchedani was that it included too much. The Digest made the Burmese law on all topics easily

Digest in advance. Ireland had kept his plans to himself until the work was in proof.

Hadford made the same bad criticism: *Samuhadda Vicchedani*, p. 30 states that the dead wife's property goes to her parents. "This is quite wrong ..." says Hadford, "for in such cases the Burmese law says that her wearing apparel only goes to her parents."

John Jardine, *Notes on Buddhist Law III* 12 December 1882, vi (Rangoon: Government Press, 1882).

available at a time when Calcutta was searching for ways to restrict the application of Burmese law to the two topics of Marriage and Inheritance. Stephen's policy was to force the Extra Assistant Commissioners to apply the Indian Contract Act instead of the dhammathat rules on Wages, Debt and Partnership. At a time when ninety percent of them spoke no English, and Rangoon was having problems getting the Anglo-Indian Codes translated into Burmese, it would have been counter-productive to endorse a printed restatement of the dhammathat rules on Contract. Both Thadoway and Ireland tried to reassure their critics. Thadoway warned that *Samuhadda Vicchedani* may contain some rules that "may conflict with royal edicts or the principles [taya-lan] in Statute Law [Ek-ubade]." Ireland added that he had eliminated anything "which would clash with the English Criminal Laws in force in British territory." And he made this rejoinder to Eden, Browne and Hadford:

It has been asserted by some critics, who have seen the text of this book, that some of the provisions in it trench upon ... the Contract Law recently passed ... [This] is a question of greater difficulty. The Laws bearing on contract questions are those followed, at present, by the purely Burman Courts.<sup>34</sup>

Like it or not, Thadoway had described Burmese law as it was. *Samuhadda Vicchedani* reflected what the Burmese judges did in their own courts. For an unbiased seeker after the truth of Burmese law, this was enough. Eden's message to Ahee of 23 January 1874 marks the end to the Government's attempts to procure such unbiased knowledge of Burmese law. Thereafter, through the 1880s and 1890s, Burmese legal history was written by Europeans, and shaped to fit their colonial agenda.

#### 4. Conclusions

What the Chief Commissioner disliked about Samuhadda Vicchedani - its catholic coverage of all the topics of Burmese law - is precisely what

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Ireland, Samuhaddha Vicchedani, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibid., iii.

makes it such a valuable source for legal historians. I can point the interested reader towards three copies in London libraries, and to another copy in Ithaca, N.Y.<sup>35</sup> After the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885-6) the Judicial Commissioners were able to force Burmese judges to apply the Indian Contract Act. The traditional Burmese rules on debt no longer governed agricultural finance, and the Chettiar money-lenders of South India, who knew how the Indian Contract Act worked, took over the funding of Burma's rice crop. By the 1930s even the most blinkered Indian Civil Servant had come to deplore the resulting landlessness and anti-Indian sentiment. We can only look at this profound social change through Burmese eyes when we can understand how agricultural finance was organised before the 1880s. Daw Than Saw's translation of Chapter 17 of *Samuhadda Vicchedani*, which follows, provides the raw material for such an understanding.

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<sup>35</sup> SOAS Library has the first edition (GPC 290.12148) and a later edition (A 345.910058). The India Office Library has a later edition (Myan. A.1546). I am told that the Koch Library at Cornell University possesses a copy. I have digitised the first edition as a series of pdf file (not all pages, alas, are legible in their entirety). Interested researchers who cannot find a copy nearby may apply to me by email.

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# The Final Part of the Samuhadda Vicchedani, Relating to Debt

# Translated by Daw Than Saw

[Readers are directed to Andrew Huxley's introduction to this translation also in the present issue of the SBBR].

# Part 17 Chapter I

Four Types of Debtors	
<ol> <li>Four types of debtors are -         <ol> <li>Someone with many relatives.</li> <li>Someone who keeps a verbal promise with integrity.</li> <li>Someone who is capable of feeling shame.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Someone who is not motivated by greed.</li> </ol>	Kozaunganyi
613 The rule prohibiting the charge of interest	
which exceeds the principal	
After the loan has been taken although interest exceeds the principal after many months and years, excessive interest should not be charged. Interest that is in proportion to the principal must be charged.	Kozaunganyi

The rule prohibiting charging interest which exceeds the principal after several years.  When the debtor apologises that he is unable to pay back the loan five or ten years after having taken it out, interest that exceeds the principal should not be charged. Interest in proportion to the principal must be charged.	Kozaunganyi Manosara Atityamin Manusara shwe myin
The rule relating to loans taken out by husband or by wife  The wife must not be asked to pay back the loan taken out by the husband without her knowledge. The husband must not be asked to pay back the loan taken out by the wife without his knowledge. Only the person who has taken out the loan must be asked to pay back the loan.	Manosara Atityamin Manusara shwe myin
The loans taken by ex-wife, new wife. Exhusband and new husband  The new wife is not to pay back the loan taken out by the ex-wife; the new husband is not to pay back the loan taken out by the ex-husband.	Kozaunganyi

Four Types of Loan	
Four Types of Loan are:  1. Loan taken out by a commoner  2. Loan taken out by members of the royal family  3. Loan taken out by a wealthy person  4. Loan taken out by a merchant	Manusara in 5 vols. Dhammavilasa Balabodana
617 Charging interest for these tour types of loan	Manusara in 5 vols.
Interest to be charged for the loan taken out by a commoner is 1 bo. Interest to be	Balabodana
charged for the loan taken out by the royal family is 2 bo. Interest to be charged for the loan taken out by a wealthy person is 4 bo. Interest to be charged for the loan taken out by a merchant is 5 bo.	Mohavicchedani
618 Differentiating interest of four types of loan	
Please note that 1 bo interest means 1 part of 100 parts; 2 parts is 2 bo, 3 parts is 3 bo; 4 parts is 4 bo; 5 parts is 5 bo. The increase in 1 bo or 2 bo means the interest rate for one month. 1 bo for 100 is calculated as 1 kyat.	Ditto
619 Six problems to do with lending	
The six problems to do with lending are:  1. The principal and interest still remain outstanding.  2. Interest has been settled but the principal still remains outstanding.	Manusara in 5 vols.  Manuwunnana

<ul> <li>3. The principal has been paid back but interest still remains outstanding.</li> <li>4. The principal and interest remain outstanding.</li> <li>5. The loan that should be paid as demanded by the creditor.</li> <li>6. The loan that should be doubled.</li> </ul>	
620 Some of the principal and some of the interest remain outstanding  A loan has been taken out. Some of the principal and some of interest have been paid back. Some of the principal and some of the interest remain outstanding. Interest should not be charged because they remain outstanding. Only the remaining principal and the remaining interest are to be paid back.	Ditto
Interest has been paid back but the principal remains outstanding  A loan has been taken out. Interest has been calculated and paid back. The principal has not been paid back and it remains outstanding. Interest is to be charged at the previous rate on the outstanding principal.	Ditto
622 The principal has been paid back but interest remains outstanding In the case of the loan when the principal has been paid back but interest remains outstanding, interest should not be charged again because interest remains outstanding.	Ditto

Both the principal and interest remains outstanding  Interest should not be charged on the principal and the interest. There must not be an additional increase in the whole loan that remains outstanding. Only the principal and interest on it must be paid back.	Manusara in 5 vols.  Manuwunnana
623 The loan that should be paid as demanded by the creditor  When the debtor and the creditor say how much interest is to be charged, interest demanded by the creditor should be charged as above.	Ditto
On taking out a loan, if the promise to repay the loan on this day or in this month has been broken, the amount of loan repayment is to be doubled. If the debtor asks for the loan before the designated day and month, interest will be void; only the principal is to be settled. If the loan is to be paid to a representative, there must not be any increase in interest. The amount of loan repayment is not to be doubled by saying that (the representative) has been assigned to do a significant or insignificant task and that the designated day and month are wrong. Only interest is to be paid.	Ditto

False Claims, Lies And Concealment by Debtors And Creditors  When the debtor says that he has paid interest although he has not, his repayment is doubled if he has spoken falsely. If the	Ditto
debtor says that he has not received money when in fact he has, calculation on the principal and interest is to be done and overpayment is to be refunded. When a claim that 20 have been lent instead of 10 is made, a false claim has been made. So fines will be calculated on the correct amount of principal. Double the amount of the	
principle is a suitable sum.	
Giving a loan to the wife without the knowledge of her husband  When a monk lends money to a wife without the knowledge of her husband, he is obliged to forfeit the money that has been lent. If a layman does this, he is obliged to relinquish half of the principal. Only half of the principal is to be paid back.	Manusara in 5 vols.  Manuwunnana
The rule concerning a loan made in return for rice  A loan is made in return for rice. Later, when neither rice nor money have been repaid, twice the amount of the principal should be paid to the debtor.	Ditto

# When a creditor demands repayment from the debtor although there is a surety Ditto Although the debtor flees and goes into hiding as a creditor has demanded loan repayment although there is a surety, the

surety must not be asked to pay the debt. The surety is not bound to pay the loan. The legal costs are to be paid by the surety.

### Chapter II

# 628 Twelve types of sureties for loans

These twelve types are:

- 1. Grandchild acts as a surety for grandparents' loan
- 2. Grandparents act as sureties for a grandchild's loan
- 3. Offspring act as sureties for parents' loan
- 4. Parents act as sureties for offspring's loan
- 5. A relation acts as a surety for the loan of his other relation
- 6. A master acts as a surety for a slave's loan.
- 7. A student acts as a surety for a teacher's loan.
- 8. A teacher acts as a surety for a student's loan.
- 9. A person who acts as surety for the loan and who jointly takes out a loan with the debtor.
- 10. A person who borrows some of the principal, but is surety for the whole sum.
- 11. A surety nominated by the debtor.
- 12. A surety nominated by the creditor.

Manu 3:56

#### 629 The rule for twelve types of sureties

Out of these 12 types, the last two are always myi-taing ('sureties'), but the first ten are ('witnesses'), unless they | Manu 3:56 merely *taing* expressly agree otherwise. In order for grandparents, offspring, parents, grandchildren, relations, teacher-and-student, master-and-slave, the surety who is partdebtor to agree to be myitaing, they must say so in writing, before witnesses, If the debtor dies, the surety must pay back principal and interest. If the debtor has fled to avoid payment, the surety must pay back the principal.

#### 630 Three types of sureties

Three types of sureties are:

- 1. A pledge to deliver the debtproperty.
- 2. 2. A pledge to deliver the debtor in person
- 3. A pledge to do both

In the third case, when a surety pledges both the debt-property and the debtor's body, if he pays the debt-property, he need not produce the debtor's body.

Manu 3:53

#### 631 Nine types of persons who should not be put in fetters, though they have not paid their debts

These nine types are:

- 1. The royal family
- 2. Brahmins
- 3. Monks
- 4. Generals
- 5. Grandfathers
- 6. Grandmothers
- 7. Mothers
- 8. Fathers
- 9. Teachers

These nine types of persons should not be in fetters. They should not disrespected. They should not be subject to demands for repayment whenever they meet the creditor.

#### Which debts are personal to husband 632 or wife, and which bind them both

The wife must not be asked to pay back her | Manu 3:30 husband's debt incurred as the result of his Manu 3:31 carnal indulgence, cockfighting, dice-playing, gambling and drinking when he has died. The husband should not be asked to pay back the wife's debt as a result of her carnal indulgence, cockfighting, dice-playing and drinking when she has died, the debt becomes void. If the debt is connected with the spouses' common interests, then the husband who has inherited his wife's assets must pay his wife's debts, and vice versa.

Manu 3:44

Manu 3:32

633 Lending money in return for rice.	
A loan of silver is to be repaid in rice. If the debtor has handed over neither silver nor rice, he must repay in rice at the rate of three times the agreed quantity.	
Four ways to analyse whether a third party has agreed to take on the debtor's liability  Taking on the debtor's liability means: four characteristics concerning when the debtor places his liability on someone else, saying to the creditor `this person shall pay my debt'.  1. Did the conversation take place shortly before the debt fell due?  2. Did the third party agree to pay?  3. Did he specifically disagree?  4. Or did he remain silent?	Ditto

The rule about these four ways of	
analysis	
	Ditto
The third party must settle the debt when	
the conversation took place shortly before	
the debt fell due, or he agreed to pay, or he	
remained silent. Only if he specifically	
disagrees, will he not have to settle the debt.	

Three ways to express the date of maturity	
Three ways to express the date of maturity are  1. By stating a (specific) day 2. By stating a month 3. By stating a year	Manusara in 5 vols. Manuwunnana
Oberanding to be repaid before the maturity date	
When the creditor demands immediate repayment from the debtor before the designated day, month or year has come, the creditor will have to forfeit half of the debt. If the creditor uses physical force in his demands, he must forfeit the whole debt.	Ditto
The rule about a surety who acts for more than one debtor.	
When one person acts as a surety for several debtors, he will have to pay the whole sum if these debtors have fled to avoid payment; however, if only one debtor has fled, the surety will only have to settle his portion of the debt.	Ditto

638 The rule when many people act as sureties for a single debtor	
When many people act as sureties for a single debtor, and the debtor has fled to avoid payment, they must pay the principal together with the interest. If only one of the sureties can be found, he is only liable to pay the principal. If the surety cannot pay, he is liable only for his share of the whole amount. If a surety knows the whereabouts of the debtor, but does not disclose it, he is liable for the whole amount.	Ditto
The rule concerning the death of a	
When the debtor dies after he has taken out	Manusara in 5 vols.
a loan, the person acting as a surety for the debtor will have to pay only the principal. Interest is not recoverable.	Manuwunnana
640 The rule about the debtor's liability to	
A surety has to pay the interest, because the debtor has fled to avoid payment after taken out a loan and not paying it back for many months and years. When the debtor returns, he will have to reimburse his surety with twice the amount that was paid.	Ditto

When the creditor prefers to recover from the surety  When the surety encourages the debtor to repay the creditor, the creditor replies that it is his own responsibility to demand repayment of the loan. If the debtor then dies, the creditor is not to ask the surety for repayment. The debt will be irrecoverable.	Ditto
The rule about joint liability for repayment when a loan is taken out by several persons  When many debtors negotiate a single loan, they are jointly liable for the whole sum, even though thy divided he loan into its constitutent parts in the creditor's presence. The only exception is when the creditor explicitly and publicly said to each co-debtor: 'You are only liable for the amount that you persoanlly have borrowed'. Only in this case will the creditor not recover when one of the co-debtors dies before repayment.	Kozaunganyi Manu 3:27
Where several members of the same family live in the same house, if one of them borrows money for the benefit of the household, the others are liable to repay the debt.	Kozaunganyi

### The effect of famine on borrowing rice

A loan of rice was made when harvest were good. However, when repayment falls due, the harvests are bad, and the debtor pays back less than the agreed amount. Later, when the debtor repays the missing sum, he must show generosity. Why is it so? Because in a time of famine and starvation, the debtor was shown lenience, and allowed to extend the loan. Only when the good harvest return does the debtor settle the loan. He must repay twice the amount borrowed. Why is it so? Because when the debtor acts in bad faith, or conceals material facts, he is liable to pay double by way of forfeiture.

Manusara in 5 vols.

Manuwunnana

# Obes remarriage make you surety for your spouse's old debts?

When a widower and widow decide to get married and cohabit, they do not become liable for each other's existing debts. Their individual affairs should not be mixed together. Only if they become a surety, are they liable.

Manusara in 5 vols.

Manu 3:50

# 646 About fluctuations between rice and silver

When people borrow rice, promising to repay in money at harvest time, arguments occur when the harvest is exceptionally good, so that the buying-power of money increases. Once upon a time, in the kingdom of Meithila, there was excessive rain. insects devoured all the grain that was stored in granaries, and 1 tin of rice sold for 1 kyat of silver. People had to borrow rice, and did so on terms that they would repay 1 kyat for each tin of rice borrowed. After the next harvest,1 kyat bought 10 tin of rice. One of the debtors offered to hand back double the amount of rice he had borrowed. The creditor insisted on being repaid in kyat, and asked for double 1 kyat, which is 2 kyat. they took their dispute to be settled by a monk. The monk explained to them the taya leba, which are the time, the place, the value and the state of the goods themselves. The monk who lived in the kingdom of Meithila during the time of the lord Buddha passed this 'He must repay 1 tin of rice. He verdict: must also repay 1 kyat of silver.'

Ditto

## Chapter III

(47 C: 41-4 114 1 114	
Six ways that a debtor can cheat his	
creditor	(a)
1. When a debt falls due after one, two or three years, the parties negotiate an extension at a different rate of interest, but the creditor forgets to destroy the original loan document. When the extended loan falls due, the creditor claims to owe the interest specified in the original document. If both creditor and debtor are in good faith, and the principal has been paid back, only the interest expressed in the first document is due. If the debtor was blameworthy, he must pay for his blame.	Manu 3:19
2. When the loan falls due, the debtor cannot repay, so he agrees with the creditor to extend the loan with the interest treated as principal. Once the agreement has been concluded, the debtor denounces it as illegal. The creditor cannot claim compound interest. But the debtor must pay what he actually owes to the creditor.	(b) ditto

3. While the loan is being negotiated, the debtor agrees to one of his family becoming the creditor's slave in the event of non-repayment. Though the slave bondage is written into the loan, it cannot be literally treated as the principal to be paid back. The equivalent of the slave's labour value each month counts towards settlement of the principal. The debt is paid off before the monthly wage payments have built up to more than the sum borrowed. The creditor's slave-bond is worthless, as long as the principal has been paid off. When the payments add up to twice the sum borrowed, the debt shall be settled.	(c) ditto
4. 'Please give me a loan. If I cannot settle it when the debt falls due, you may seize all my property.' Despite the fact that the loan document includes this term, the creditor may only seize goods worth twice the principal.	(d) ditto
5. The parties propose 'let the loan document record different commodities in different amounts from what is actually lent, so that a different rate of interest is due'. They agree and draw up the loan document accordingly. If no repayment has been made, the true interest rate is payable. But if some repayments under the written rate of interest have been paid, the written interest rate is payable.	(e) ditto

6. The debtor says: `Make me a loan. When repayment falls due I will repay you by constructing in your name a buddha image, a pagoda, a stupa, a library of religious texts, a set of <i>kammavaca</i> text, a pavilion, a well, a pond, or a monastery.' If the debtor does not do as promised, he must pay twice the amount of the principal. And he must be punished by the king for cheating in matters of merit and rebirth.	(f) ditto
649 Six ways that a creditor can cheat a debtor	
1 When the debt fell due and could not be	(a)
1. When the debt fell due and could not be repaid, the debtor negotiated an extension of the loan with the creditor. They treated interest as capital, by substituting members of the debtor's family for the debtor when the silver was publicly weighed out. The debtor's son and daughter who cohabit with him need only repay the principal. The creditor forfeits his interest because of cheating. He must also be punished by the king.	ditto
2. The debtor takes a loan, pledging his	(b)
property, and cannot repay it. He wants to borrow enough from a third party to pay off the interest and principal on the loan. The creditor recommends a third party with whom to refinance. Later it emerges that the creditor provided the third party with enough capital to refinance the loan. If this is proved, only the principal need be repaid. The creditor forfeits his interest, because he concealed material facts. The king should harshly punish the wealthy party.	ditto

3. When the loan falls due, a creditor says to the (c) debtor: 'pay me back by refinancing with a third party. When the new loan falls due, I will refinance it.' The debtor borrows money from the third party and pays off his creditor. When the second loan falls due, the creditor refuses to refinance it. Such a creditor is guilty of cheating. The king should punish him.

ditto

4. When the interest payment fell due, and the debtor could not pay, the creditor agreed to accept commodities equal in value to the interest owed. The loan was originally for silver: they pretended that silver was rice. Then rice became a kind of copper, then it became sesame seeds, cotton, cloth, garments. This went on for 10 years. The wealthy party disputed with the debtor as to how much principal and interest was due. Let the debtor only pay back the principal and the interest. The intermediate stages do not count. What was agreed at the very beginning determines how the debt shall be settled at the very end. If some commodities, like rice, sesame seeds, cotton and kinds of copper have been handed over as interest at any stage, so that in total four times the sum borrowed was repaid, the overpayment may be recovered. The king should punish the wealthy party.

(d)

ditto

5. When buffaloes, cows, horses and elephants are hired out on credit, this counts as a loan of the hiring-fee. A debtor could not pay his hirefees in silver. He offered in full settlement to return the animal with its new offspring. When the original agreement was for silver, can he settle it in livestock? One side argues that only money is acceptable, since that was originally stipulated. The other side correctly states that if no money has been handed over, the debt may be settled two animals for one. But if the animal borrowed has become thin, or broken a bone, or lost its sight, the debtor must repay the wealthy party in silver at the given rate. He cannot put in issue its not being thin, its bones not being broken, it not losing its sight. He shall be paid the difference between the original and the present value of the animal. If it dies, two animals, or the value for which two animals may be sold, must be handed back to settle the debt. The payment of such interest accords with verbal agreements. If the animal dies within ten days of being hired, the wealthy party shall be sent as evidence the flesh, the hide, the head and the tail. When this is one, the debtor owes nothing. Why is it so? The material evidence has settled the loan. If the wealthy party is not sent this evidence, twice the value of the animal that died must be paid back to him.

(e)

ditto

6. A person enters a trading partnership, saying 'I lend the capital, you go on the trading voyage, and we will divide the profits on the basis that you borrowed the capital from me for months or years.' Such a creditor is dishonest. When the debtor returns from his voyage after many months and years, they should share profits and loss. The creditor has tricked his business partner with words. The wealthy party must not account as for a loan, when they should be sharing profit and loss. The creditor must pay twice the capital he originally supplied.	(f) ditto
650 Seven occasions on which one should not seek repayment	
<ol> <li>At the peaceful new year water festival</li> <li>During the coronation</li> </ol>	Manu 3:69
3. During the nat festival	
4. Mahar painnhwe festival	
5. When the foundations of the new capital of the king's golden kingdom are being laid	Ditto
6. When the debtor is listening to a sermon.	
7. When the debtor is giving offerings to the nat of his house as he is grievously ill.	
If repayment of a loan is demanded on any of the first five occasions, the debt will be null and void. If repayment is demanded while the	

debtor is listening to a sermon, 100 royal lashes must be inflicted on the creditor. If the debtor is assaulted, 1,000 lashes must be inflicted on the creditor. If the creditor dare not undergo the king's punishment, it may be commuted to a 10 kyat fine for asking for a repayment and a 30 kyat fine for assaulting the debtor. A creditor who demanded repayment while the debtor was ill and making offerings to the nat, he will be fined 10 kyat for the demand and 30 kyat for assaulting the debtor. The debt remains valid, and the debtor must settle both principal and interest. Where the parties to a loan are relatives 651 who share a common great-grandfather Relatives must not charge interest on loan given other relatives who have the grandfather. The debtor need only repay the Manu 3:11 principal. If there has been bad faith, only one tenth of the interest need be repaid. Punish the creditor with cane lashes. Expel him from the circle of relatives. Make him clean elephants' dung and horses' manure as an untouchable at the bottom of the social ladder. The debtor who makes a false accusation should receive the same punishment. The rule about a high status creditor 652 Where the creditor is laden with wealth and prosperity, and a poor debtor cannot make Kozaunganyi repayment, let the creditor assist the debtor by extending the loan. The debtor must, in return, honestly try to get sufficient money to pay the creditor back.

## Chapter IV

Although it appears that the debtor is richer than the creditor, the debtor must repay the principal and interest. This is no reason for the due to be postponed.  654 The rule called 're-using the scales'  When a debt falls due, even though many years have passed, the interest cannot exceed the principal. Except where a debtor who
than the creditor, the debtor must repay the principal and interest. This is no reason for the due to be postponed.  654 The rule called 're-using the scales'  When a debt falls due, even though many years have passed, the interest cannot exceed
When a debt falls due, even though many years have passed, the interest cannot exceed
years have passed, the interest cannot exceed
cannot pay back the loan publicly agrees to 're-use the scales' (treat outstanding interest as principal). If he does, he may be charged 50% more interest. The meaning of 're-using the scales' is 'taking a new loan with which to pay off interest.'
655 The rule where interest is treated as
principal though the scales have not been re-used
Instead of re-using the scales, the debtor agrees to extend the loan at compound interest. In this case, no additional interest must be charged. Repayment must be made according to the loan document.

## Borrowing rice, barley, corn, peas, sesame seeds and cotton

The loan of rice, barley, corn, peas, sesame seeds and cotton must be paid back with interest in the year of maturity. If two years have passed, four times the value of the loan must be paid back by quadrupling the original amount of produces (borrowed).

Dhammavilasa

Manu 3:13

# 657 The rule that equates the sale of animate or inanimate goods to be paid at a fixed future date with a loan

Animate or inanimate goods have been sold on credit, the price to be paid at a fixed future time and place. When the creditor comes with the sale document to receive payment, the debtor fails to pay. If just a little over twelve months have passed, let him pay only what is due. If many months after the end of the twelve-month period have passed, no matter how long it is behind schedule, only interest equal to the principal is due. When the debt is settled within twelve months, let interest be calculated pro rata the length of the loan. The same rule applies to the case when the failure to deliver the goods occurs before the creditor and debtor arrives at a chosen place. The repayment must be made in the same manner. He may not plead that sale is different from debt, and does not attract interest payments.

Manu 3:18

658 The rule concerning repayment by wives living under separate households for the loan taken by their husband	
When a man has wives living in different villages, or in different houses in the same village, one wife and family are not liable for the loan taken by her husband while he is living with another wife. The wife and children where the husband is residing are liable to repay.	Manu 3:48
The rule concerning loan repayment by widows and widowers	
A widow or a widower takes out a loan, and then gets remarried. The creditor may not ask the debtor's spouse for repayment, after they are divorced. The creditor must only demand the debt from the spouse that took out the loan.	Manu 3:69
The rule forbidding demanding repayment from lesser wives and lesser	
There are people who have lesser wives or lesser husbands. The wife with whom a man lives after (his first marriage) will not have to repay the loan taken while living with the first wife. The debt is to be settled by the children of the first wife. Similarly, the debt from the time of the first husband must not be settled by the husband of later marriage. The children of the first husband must settle this debt. However, if the first wife and the first husband have no child, the wife and	Manu 3:71

husband of later marriages must settle the debt as they are entitled to inherit the assets of these previous spouses. Considering this, if there is nothing to inherit from the previous marriages, they will have to settle one fourth of the debt. However, if there is a guarantor for the full debt, the original loan has to be repaid.

# 661 The rule concerning the public bankruptcy ritual

A person has a lot of debts, and no relatives, no friends and no patrons. Such a man can appeal to the king. In accordance with the *four* sangaha rules, the king will loan him capital. After three years, the debtor, due to his lack of luck, intelligence and diligence, fails and cannot pay back the loan. The debtor is sent for in front of monks and brahmins. He is made to wear white clothes. Creditors have been asked to assemble. (Then the king says) "although I, the king, have given assistance, there is no progress. I will show him clemency. I ask the creditors to show him mercy." Then suttas are recited. Then conch shell horns and drums are played. And the debtor is allowed to be free. This ritual is known as myi-ta-lin-hle. Even if the debtor were, as the result of his merits from previous lives, to become rich again, the creditor may not demand repayment of the loan. The creditor should not accept the loan repayment although the debtor repays his debt as he has now money. This rule of bankruptcy must not be exercised by others except the king.

Manu 3:74

# The rule by which a debtor's assets are sold and the proceeds divided between his creditors

Manu 3:75

A person has a lot of debts. Several creditors seize his belongings, animate and inanimate. Then, they approach the rulers of town and villages and sell his belongings to the wealthy. Then the creditors divide the money received from the sale of the objects they seized. This is called *myi-baung-chwe*. Later, when the debtor becomes rich because of merits from his previous existences, no repayment of the loan repayment may be demanded. But if, with a view to his future rebirth, the debtor chooses to pay back his creditors, they may accept the money.

# Intra-dynastic and Inter-Tai Conflicts in the Old Kingdom of Moeng Lü in Southern Yunnan<sup>1</sup>

Foon Ming Liew-Herres (Hamburg)

#### Introduction

Power struggles within ruling houses are a classic problem causing the weakening of dynasties and inviting foreign invasions. The Tai polities in pre-modern Asia were no exception. This recurrent problem is documented not only in contemporary Chinese sources, but also in the various versions of the Tai chronicles that the present writer has investigated. The present article focuses on the example of the Tai Lü polity, namely Moeng Lü (better known as Sipsòng Panna), which was founded in the twelfth century in present-day southern Yunnan along what Jon Fernquest has called the "Tai Frontier." When waging fratricidal wars or committing fratricide to gain the throne was concerned, the traditional Tai polities in this frontier between China and the large lowland polities of mainland Southeast Asia were no better than the ruling houses of medieval Europe and China.

As a rule, the line of succession of the ruling house of the Tai Lü was by right of primogeniture, except in the first reign, when Cao Phaya Coeng (r. 1180–1192/1159–1180 CE) made his youngest son the crown prince. The first fratricide took place as early as the reign of Cao Phaya Coeng's grandson, Ai Kung (r. 1201–1206). From then on, civil wars culminating in invitations of help from neighbouring Tai polities became

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The present article is a revised version of a paper, originally entitled "Power Struggle Within the Ruling House of Moeng Lü and Inter Tai Conflicts," that the present author delivered at the 10th International Thai Conference held at Thammasat University in January 2008. The author wishes to thank Donald Holliday, a retired civil engineer from Windermere, who helped me to proofread this paper and provided valuable comments, as well as Mike Charney and the anonymous referees for this article for their comments and suggestions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Jon Fernquest, "Crucible of War: Burma and the Ming in the Tai Frontier Zone (1382-1454)," SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research 4.2 (Autumn, 2006): 34.

a recurrent phenomenon. The first well-documented and major fratricidal conflict between the two cousins Tao Kü Moeng's (r. 1413–1415/1433–1436) brother Tao Kham Tet (r. 1417–1428/1442–1445) and Süa Luang Fa (r. 1446–1466) and their descendants, took place immediately after the death of Tao Sida Kham (r. 1350–1430). It ended almost four decades later when Tao Sam Po Lütai (r. 1467–1490), the youngest son of Tao Kü Moeng, regained his father's throne.


The Mekong River not only divided the Tai Lü polities into eastern and western parts, but often also the loyalties of the *cao moeng* of Moeng Lü. Lan Na troops and Moeng Laem troops were involved in these civil wars. The next well-documented civil war took place in the reign of Tao Thai Kho (r. 1764–1770) and, this time, foreign involvement came in the form of the rising power from the west, the Burmese. These are also recorded in contemporary Chinese sources. This article provides a survey of the major civil wars that involved the support of foreign troops.

### Location and History

In the mid- to late twelfth century, a Tai noble, Cao Phaya Coeng (Li: r. 1180–1192/Gao: 1159–1180),<sup>3</sup> founded Moeng Lü (the polity of the Lü), later known as Sipsòng Panna (the confederation of twelve *panna*), in what is today southern Yunnan. <sup>4</sup> Moeng Lü's neighbours were Lan Na (in present-day northern Thailand), Laos (Lan Sang), Chiang Tung (Moeng Khün in present-day Burma), and Moeng Laem (in present-day Yunnan). The northern boundary of the ancient Moeng Lü bordered on Moeng La (Simao) and Moeng Bò (Jinggu). Moeng Lae (in present-day Jiangcheng) to the east and Moeng Thalang (Mojiang) to the north were also under Moeng Lü.


<sup>3</sup> The dates given follow that of Li Fuyi (1947), followed by the dates given in Gao Lishi (1984). The dates given in Gao Lishi are similar to those given in the 1963-Chronicle of Tai Lü. Li Fuyi 李拂一, Leshi 泐史 (History of Moeng Lü) (Kunming: Wenjian shuju, 1947), translated into English by Liew Foon Ming; in manuscript, and Gao Lishi 高力士, "Xishuang Banna zhao pianling sishisi shi shimo 西雙版納召片領四十四世始末" [The History of Forty-four reigns of Cao Phaendin of Sipsòng Panna], (Yunnan: Minzu diaocha yanjiu, No. 2, 1984): pp. 102–131, translated into English by Liew Foon Ming, in manuscript.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Phaya Coeng is revered among the Tai peoples of mainland Southeast Asia. He is their cultural hero, either as a historical hero or a Tai mythical king.



Before the expansion of Burma and the arrival of the French, a great part of present-day Phong Sali in Laos, i.e., the region north of Moeng Sai, belonged to the outer *moeng* of Moeng Lü. The domain of the old Moeng Lü, before the outer subordinate polities (*moeng*) were ceded to adjacent lands for various reasons, was much larger. Present-day Sipsòng Panna, which has an area of less than twenty thousand square kilometres, is merely the core region of former Moeng Lü.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Modern Sipsòng Panna is divided into three counties—Jinghong (6,958 sq. km), Menghai (5,511 sq. km), and Mengla (7,093 sq. km), and this makes a total area of 19,562 sq. km. Before 1896, when Moeng U-Nüa and Moeng U-Tae were ceded to what was then French Indochina (now in Phong Sali of Laos), and Simao (Moeng La) was placed under direct Chinese rule in 1913, Sipsòng Panna had an area of ca. 25,000 sq. km. However, Sipsòng Panna, after successive years of civil wars and foreign invasions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was sparsely



According to the Chronicles of Moeng Lü (Nangsü pün Moeng Lü/Sipsòng Panna), edited by contemporary Tai Lü scholars from several old Tai Lü manuscript-copies, the Kingdom of the Lü, which had a history of more than seven and a half centuries, had forty-four rulers. The last ruler, Cao Moeng Kham Lü (i.e., Dao Shi-xun 刀 世 勳, r.

populated at the beginning of the last century. According to the census taken in the 1920s, there were only 168,390 people and among them eighty percent were Tai Lü. See Li Fuyi, Cheli 車里 [Sipsòng Panna], in *Shidi xiao congshu* 史地小叢書 [Collectanea of History and Geography] (Shangwu yinshu guan, 1933).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> According to Gao Lishi (1984), from Phaya Coeng to Cao Moeng Kham Lü there were forty-four rulers (similar to the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle). But according to Li Fuyi (1947), from Phaya Coeng to Dao Zheng-zong (Cao Suca Wanna Laca) there were thirty-seven rulers. Cao Suca Wanna Laca was the thirty-ninth ruler according to Gao Lishi (1984).

1947–1950), abdicated his throne in 1950 after control of Yunnan was wrested from Kuomintang forces by the People's Liberation Army. In 1953, Sipsòng Panna was reorganised into a type of "Autonomous Subprefecture of Sipsòng Panna of the Tai Nationality." Cao Moeng Kham Lü is now living in Kunming.

Moeng Lü, the old name of Sipsòng Panna, survived in the south of China until 1950. During this period, China was ruled by four consecutive dynasties: the Southern Song (1127–1279), the Yuan (1280–1368), the Ming (1368–1644), and the Qing (1644–1911), as well as the Republican Period (1912–1949). Interestingly, this Tai polity had always been known as Cheli 徹里 or 車里 to China and the peoples were called *baiyi*.<sup>7</sup>

The founder of the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127) was not interested in having diplomatic contacts with the southern tribal kingdoms in Yunnan because of the bad experience of the preceding dynasty, the Tang (618–907), with the Kingdom of Nanzhao (728–902). The successor of Nanzhao was Dali (937–1094), which was later taken by the so-called Later Dali (1096–1253). In 1253, Moeng-k'o T'ier-mu-er (r. 1251–1259) conquered Dali and Yunnan was officially incorporated into the domain of China under the Yuan Dynasty (1280–1368). Since then, the name Cheli appears in the Chinese records, in particular that of the Ming (1368–1644) and of the Qing (1644–1911) periods.

As far as the present author is aware, the first six kings of Moeng Lü (Cao Phaya Coeng, Sam Khai Noeng, Ai Kung, Tao Hung Kaen Cai, Tao Haeng Luang, and Tao Puwak) are not recorded in the Chinese sources prior to the Yuan dynasty (1280–1368), that is, during the Southern Song period (1127–1279). The name Cheli first appears in the Chinese sources in the *History of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuanshi*) in 1284 CE:

In the year Zhiyuan 21 (1284; CS 646), [...] Furthermore, [Bulu-he-da 步 魯 合 答] participated in a military campaign against the land of Babai-xifu 八 百 媳 婦 國 (Lan Na). [They] arrived at Cheli 車 厘 (Moeng Lü). Cheli is where their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The two common transcriptions of Baiyi are *Baiyi* 擺 夷 or *Baiyi* 百 夷. The first *Baiyi* can be interpreted as "the barbarians who celebrate the *Pai* ceremony;"the later *Baiyi* is the Chinese rendering of the various Tai peoples in Yunnan.

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chieftain resides. The prince Kuokuo 闊 闊 ordered Bu-lu-heda to command 300 mobile cavalry and proceed to persuade them to submit. As they refused to listen, troops were marched to conquer them. The chief military commissioner (du zhenfu) Hou Zheng 侯 正 was killed. Bu-lu-he-da destroyed the wood of the Northern Gate, entered the stockade-village, and the land [of Cheli] was pacified. [...].

Not long afterwards, in a record dated 1290, we learn that Cheli had submitted to China. According to Li Fuyi (1947), it was in the reign of Cao Phaya Coeng (r. 1180–1192). According to Gao Lishi (1984), however, it occured during the reign of Sam Khai Noeng (r. 1180–1201). As the *Yuanshi* relates,

In the year Zhiyuan 27, Autumn, 7th month, on *bingyin* day (1290 CE; CS 652), the chieftains of the Baiyi (generic term for the Tai peoples) from a total of eleven *dian* (villages/polities) of Sheli 閣力 (namely Cheli) in Yunnan submitted and adhered to China.<sup>9</sup>

Cao Ai (r. 1287–1347/1271–1311) is mentioned in a record dated 1326 of the *History of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuanshi*). He was the *Cao Phaendin* (lord of the land) of the Greater Cheli. As this record relates:

In the year Taiding 3, 9th month, on wuchen day [1326 CE] ... Ai Yong 哀用, the nephew of the chieftain of the Greater Cheli, Zhao Ai 昭哀 (Cao Ai), and the tribal official of Menglong dian 孟隆甸 (Moeng Luang), Wu Zhong 吾仲, paid tribute [to the Yuan court]. The land under Zhao Ai (Cao Ai) was partitioned to establish Muduo Route木朵路 and Mulai Sub-prefecture木來州, as well as three villages (dian).

<sup>9</sup> Yuanshi, ch. 16, p. 339.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Yuanshi, ch. 132, p. 3207-08 (Memoir of Bu-lu-he-da). All the quotations from Yuanshi given here have been directly translated by the present author.

The land under Wu Zhong was partitioned to establish Menglong Route 孟隆路 (Moeng Luang) and one village. One *dian* was established in the land of Ai Pei. They were issued the golden credentials and the copper seals and granted varying amounts of paper money, silk, saddles and reins/bridles.<sup>10</sup>

Moeng Lü, divided by the Mekong River into two nearly equal halves, was not always one unified kingdom. In the record dated the winter of 1296/97, the Mongol Yuan court already knew that there were two Chelis, the greater and the Lesser, one to the east of the Mekong River and one to the west of the Mekong River. As this record relates:

In the year Yuanzhen 2, 12th month, on wu-xu day (winter of 1296/97), the Military-cum-Civilian Route Command of Cheli 徹里 (Moeng Lü) was established.11 The branch Secretariat of Yunnan said: "The [border] lands of the Greater Cheli and those of Babai-xifu are interlocking with one another, resembling dog's teeth. Now that Hu Nian 胡 念 (Khün Nian ?), [the chieftain of] the Greater Cheli has surrendered but [the chieftain of the Lesser Cheli again annexes [his neighbour's] land, kills and loots repeatedly. Hu Nian has sent his younger brother, Hu Lun 胡倫 (Khün Luang?) to ask for permission to establish a separate pacification commission. A man who knows the situation of the southern barbarians shall be the commander, appointed to be SO that he induce/persuade the [tribal] peoples to return to allegiance. It shall serve as the base for further advancement." A decree was issued ordering that the Military-cum-Civil officials in Meng

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Yuanshi, ch. 30, p. 673.

<sup>11</sup> According to *Jingtai Yunnan tujing zhishu*, the Military-cum-Civilian Route Command of Cheli was established in Zhiyuan 11, *jia-xu* (1274 CE). Taxes in gold and silver were to be raised annually. *Jingtai Yunnnan tujing zhishu* 景泰雲南圖經志書 [Provincial Gazetteer of Yunnan of Jingtai reign], compiled by Zheng Yong鄭顒& Chen Wen 陳文, photographic reprint of the 1455 edition, in *Xuxiu siku quanshu*, history section, v. 681 (Shanghai: 1995–2002). In *Zhengde Yunnan zhi*, it is stated that the Military-cum-Civilian Route Command of Cheli was established in the Zhiyuan reign (1265–94) and six *dian* (villages/polities) were subordinate to it.

Yanggang 蒙 樣 剛 (Moeng Yanggang) and other dian (tribal villages) were to be reinstated.<sup>12</sup>

This indicates that there was a struggle for the throne among the members of the ruling house and that Cheli was divided.

The first Tai Lü king appearing in the Ming sources is Dao Kan 刀 坎 and he is identified as Cao Kan Moeng (r. 1347–1391/1312–1350). From then on, more and more Chinese sources pertaining to the Tai Lü rulers emerged:

In the year Hongwu 15, [2nd month+, on *gui-mao* day] (April 7, 1382), following the conquest of Yunnan, the tribal chieftain (*man-zhang* 蠻長), Dao Kan 刀坎 (Cao Khan Moeng, r. 1347–1391) came to offer his capitulation. On *yi-si* day (April 9), [the Sali Route Command of the Yuan] was reorganised into the Military-cum-Civilian Prefecture (*jun-min fu* 軍民府) of Cheli, and the aboriginal chieftain (*tu-qiu* 土 茵) Dao Kan (Cao Khan Moeng) was appointed the [tribal] Prefect (*zhi-fu* 知府). <sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Yuanshi 19, p. 407. A rather similar record is to be found in Yuanshi 61, 1463–64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Yunnan was conquered by 300,000 Ming troops commanded by General Lan Yu 藍 玉 (d. 1391), Fu Youde 傅 友 德 (d. 1394), and Mu Ying 沐 英 (1345–1392). See *Taizu Shilu* 141, 2228 (Hongwu 15, 1<sup>st</sup> month, *gengxu*: Feb. 13, 1382).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See *Taizu Shilu* 143, 2246–47 (Hongwu 15, 2<sup>nd</sup> month+, guimao day). Dao Kan, the eighth ruler of Moeng Lü, was clever and capable. For a description of how Dao Kan tried to avoid a direct confrontation with Ming troops, see *Leshi* (1947), pp. 5–6, translated by F. M. Liew into English.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> A *junmin fu* is a Ming administrative unit, organised in tribal area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Mingshi Gao 189, 29b; Taizu Shilu 143, 2247 (Hongwu 15, 2<sup>nd</sup> moon, ji-si day). All the quotations from Mingshi Gao and Ming Shilu given here have been directly translated by the present author (non-Chinese readers interested in the Ming Shilu are directed to Geoff Wade's "Southeast Asia in the Ming Shilu," an open access resource, first made available in 2005, available at http://www.epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/). One could interpret the Ming court's establishment of a prefecture (fu) in Cheli, instead of an aboriginal commission (tusi), as an attempt to incorporate Cheli (Moeng Lü) into the Chinese administrative system of Yunnan proper. The Chinese considered that a Tai müang

The successive monarch of Moeng Lü to the Tai Lü was their *Cao Phaendin* (ruler/lord of the land), but to China they were their *Xuan-wei shi* 宣慰使 (lit. pacification commissioner). The *Xuanwei shi* has been rendered into Tai Lü as *Saenwi Fa* (i.e., pacification lord), which is a combination of the Chinese *xuan-wei* 宣慰 (lit. pacify and soothe) and the Tai *fa/pha* (lord). They were the so-called aboriginal officials (*tu-guan* 土 宣) appointed by China to rule their own peoples according to their own customs. As for the *tu-si* 土 司 (aboriginal office) system created by the Mongol Yuan court of China in order to exert indirect rule over the kingdoms of the Tai peoples in Southern China and in what is today mainland Southeast Asia, space does not allow a detailed discussion in the present article.<sup>17</sup>

#### Fratricide and Fratricidal Wars

Tai Lü royal marriage patterns encouraged periodic conflicts within ruling families. Tai Lü kings and princes practised polygamy and, as a rule, they took the princesses of neighbouring Tai or Shan polities, such as Chiang Tung and Moeng Laem, as their consorts. The Moeng Lü princesses were also married to the princes of the surrounding Tai or Shan polities. So the family ties of the ruling house extended to the peripheral lands of Moeng Lü. During times of fighting over the throne, troops from maternal grandparents or fathers-in-law were frequently sought. The Tai Lü kings were also allowed to marry their cousins or their deceased cousin's wives in order to strengthen their position or claim to the throne, such as in the case of Süa Luang Fa, one of the grandsons of Tao Kham Moeng. This made relationships within the ruling house very complicated. The members of the ruling house, invested as cao moeng (rulers of the lesser surrounding polities), were split into factions in times of disputes for succession to the throne. The ambitious uncles of the crown prince also posed a great threat to the

<sup>(</sup>polity) could be organised into a *fu* (prefecture) or a *zhou* (sub-prefecture), or a *xian* (county), depending on the seize of the *müang*. This political aim eventually materialised in the 1950s.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For the *tusi* system, see Liew, F. M. (1998), pp. 63–68; Liew, F. M. (2003), pp. 144–186.

throne, in particular when the crown prince was still not yet of age at the time of his father's death.<sup>18</sup>

Three fratricides and three long fratricidal wars over the throne of the *Saenwi Fa* are recorded in the Tai Lü chronicles. For convenience, these will be referred together generically as "fratricidal conflicts" in the present article. As the chronicles of many reigns are very brief, there were probably other unrecorded civil wars, a fact that should be kept in mind even though details remain unavailable. As a rule, the line of succession of the ruling house of the Tai Lü was by right of primogeniture, except in the first reign when Cao Phaya Coeng (r. 1180–1192/1159–1180 CE) made his youngest son, Tao Sam Khai Noeng (r. 1192–1211/1180–1201), the crown prince. Other sons were invested as the lords of outer or foreign *moeng* (lands).

#### The First Fratricidal Conflict

The first attempted usurpation took place in the reign of Cao Phaya Coeng's grandson. Tao Sam Khai Noeng (r. 1192–1211/1180–1201) had two sons: the elder was Tao Pung and the younger was Ai Yi Pung. Tao Pung succeeded his father to the throne and Ai Yi Pung was invested as the ruler of three *panna* (M. Hun, M. Hai, and M. Cae), located to the west of the Mekong River. The following is recorded in Li Fuyi's *Leshi* (1947):

The second son Ai Yi Poeng (Piang) was invested the lord of three panna in Moeng Hun, Moeng Hai, and Moeng Cae (to the west of the Mekong). [...] Tao [Sam] Kham Noeng's eldest son Tao Pung (Kung) succeeded his father to the throne in CS 573 (1211). His younger brother Ai Yi Poeng (Piang) revolted and attempted to usurp the throne. Later, he was killed by his elder brother Tao Pung (Kung). After his death he became a siia moeng (phi moeng). Hence, oblations have been offered at a certain time of the year and it had been observed to the present

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> As in the case of Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) (r. 1802–1822) and his uncle, Tao Thai Kang (Cao Mahawang).

day. 19

A very similar account is recorded in the Tai Lü Chronicle (1963) manuscript<sup>20</sup> and in Gao Lishi (1984):

The younger brother of Ai Kung (1201–1206), Yi Piang (Poeng), was invested as the lord of the three *panna*, Moeng Hun, Moeng Hai and Moeng Cae. Because he plotted to usurp his elder brother's throne, he was killed by his elder brother. After his death he became a "*phi moeng*" and every year oblations were offered, which is practised to the present day. During this reign a fratricidal war broke out because of fighting to be the ruler of the *Saenwi fa*.<sup>21</sup>

#### The Second Fratricidal Conflict

The second fratricidal conflict recorded took place not long afterwards during the reign of the fifth ruler, Tao Haeng Luang (r. 1257–1273/1228–1254). Tao Haeng Luang had two sons: the elder Tao Puwak (r. 1273–1287/1255–1269) and the younger Yi Peng (Piang) Lak Sai. Tao

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> All of the quotations from the Li Fuyi (1947) given here have been directly translated by the present author.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This is a Tai Lü chronicle edited from several Tai Lü manuscripts in 1963 and distributed among the Tai officials in Chiang Rung. See Foon Ming Liew-Herres, "An introduction to the Tai Lü sources of the history of Moeng Lü (Sipsong Panna): Various Tai Lü Manuscript-copies on the 'Dynastic History of Moeng Lü' that have been translated into Chinese or transcribed into Thai and the salient studies of the History of Moeng Lü (Leshi), 1947-2001," *Aseanie* 14 (Decembre 2004). A Tai scholar, Ai Kham, gave this precious manuscript to the present author in 2005. The content of the 1963 manuscript is very similar to that of Gao Lishi's (1984) translation (also based on old manuscripts, but Mr. Gao was unable to provide his original manuscripts). V. Grabowsky, with the help of Renoo W. (from Chiang Mai) and the present author, translated the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle into English in 2005. The Tai Lü/Tai names and special terms of the present author's earlier translations of Li Fuyi (1947) and Gao Lishi (1984) were improved from the translations of the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> All the quotations from Gao Lishi given here have been directly translated by the present author.

Puwak was the heir apparent while Yi Peng (Piang) Lak Sai was adopted by Cao Moeng Fòng (Pòng), Fa Kham Kòng, who had no son. As Li Fuyi (1947) relates,

In the third year [1275 CE], when Tao Puwak was on the throne, Yi [Peng/Piang] Lak Sai suddenly led the people of Moeng Fòng and the troops of Moeng Mao Luang to attack his elder brother. The battle was fought at Moeng Cae. [As Yi Peng Lak Sai] could not gain a victory he withdrew (Li Fuyi, 1947).

A slightly different account is recorded in the 1963-Tai Lü and Gao Lishi (1984).

During his (Tao Puwak's) reign, Moeng Mao Luang sent troops to attack [Chiang Rung]. Defeated by Sipsòng Panna, [they] retreated to their country. At that time Cao Moeng Fòng, Fa Kham Kòng, had no son, so he adopted Tao Puwak's younger brother Yi Peng Lak Sai (Gao Lishi, 1984).

#### The Third Fratricidal Conflict

The next civil war took place soon after the death of the tenth ruler, Tao Sida Kham (r. 1391–1413/1350–1430). It lasted several decades until the death of his grandson, Tao Sam Pò Lütai (r. 1457–1497/1467–1490). In between, there was a temporary peace of over twenty years during the reign of Süa Luang Fa (r. 1428–1457/1446–1466), but lands were ceded in exchange for military aid. During these years, China also saw the emergence of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Tai Lü rulers and princes, such as Dao Kan 刀 坎 (Tao Khan Moeng), Dao Dian 刀 典 (Tao Kham Tet), Dao Xian-da 刀 暹 答 (Tao Sida Kham), Dao Geng-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> According to the Li Fuyi (1947), it was eighty-fours years from the death of Tao Sida Kham in 1413 to the death of Tao Sam Pò Lütai in 1497. According to Gao Lishi (1984) and the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle, it was sixty years from the death of Tao Sida Kham in 1430 to the death of Tao Sam Pò Lütai in 1490.

meng 刀更孟 (Tao Kü Moeng), Dao Ba-xian 刀霸羨 (Tao Phasaeng), Dao Ba-gong 刀霸供 (Tao Bakòng), Dao Shuang-meng 刀雙孟 (Tao Sòng Moeng), Dao Long 刀弄 (Tao Luang), San Bao Lidai 三寶歷代 (Tao Sam Pò Lütai), Dao Si-long 刀思弄 (Tao Süa Luang) and Ban-ya Zhong 板雅忠 (Phaya Còm), etc., are recorded in the "Veritable Records of the Ming" (*Ming Shilu*) and the "Draft of the Ming History (*Mingshi Gao*).<sup>23</sup>

According to Li Fuyi (1947), Tao Khan Moeng had three sons: Tao Sida Kham, Tao Kumman, and Peo Fei Fa. Tao Sida Kham was the crown prince.<sup>24</sup> Tao Sida Kham married the younger sister of Cao Moeng Khün (Òn Ai/Ai Òn), who was a Tai Khün princess. They had three sons: Tao Kü Moeng, Tao Kham Tet (Tiat), and Tao Saeng Moeng, and a daughter Nang Lun Koei.<sup>25</sup>

Tao Sida Kham's younger brother, Poe Fai Fa, who married the daughter of Phaya Sòng Fa of Moeng Laem, a princess of Moeng Laem, had three sons: Daet Ham Ya Pò Tai, Thaloen, who died young, and Süa Luang Fa. Süa Luang Fa was adopted by his uncle, Tao Sida Kham, and he later married his cousin, Nang Lun Koei. So Süa Luang Fa became the son-in-law of his uncle, Tao Sida Kham, who was also his foster father. Thus, after the death of Tao Sida Kham, murder and warfare ensued among brothers, uncles, nephews and cousins.<sup>26</sup>

### Tao Kham Tet ousts his elder brother Tao Kü Moeng

The Chronicles of Tai Lü depict Tao Kü Moeng (r. 1413–1315/1433–1436), the heir to the throne of his father, Tao Sida Kham, as a very cruel and unscrupulous ruler. His younger brother, Tao Kham Tet (r. 1415–1428/1442–1445), ousted him in 1415. Later, the people of Chiang

He was born to the Lawa (Lua) girl, hòi sam cik (three-pronged-conch shell).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ming Shilu is a very important contemporary Ming source.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> But, according to Gao Lishi (1984) and the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle, Tao Sida Kham had two sons: Tao Kü Moeng and Tao Kham Tet, as well as a daughter, Nang Lun Koei.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Tao Kü Moeng and his brother, Tao Kham Tet; Tao Kham Tet and his two nephews, Tao Sòng Moeng and Tao Bakòng; Tao Kham Tet and his cousin, Süa Luang Fa, etc.

Fòng at Moeng Khòn alledgedly murdered him. As Li Fuyi (1947) relates:

Tao Kü Moeng was a cruel and unscrupulous ruler. He favoured strange punishments and invented the methods of crushing [criminals] with a mangle; hanging criminals on a cowherd's pole by an iron hook into the spine; and slicing off a piece of flesh per day, a punishment of slow dismemberment of prolonged death. [...]. He neither followed the ancestral injunctions nor listened to the advice of [his cousin] Süa Luang Fa. As Süa Luang Fa was afraid that he would be the [next] victim, he sought refuge at Ban Cae in Moeng Hun.<sup>27</sup> In the third year of the reign of Tao Kü Moeng (CS 777: [1415 CE]), Tao Kham Tet (Tiat), afraid that he would be killed by [his brother Tao Kü Moengl for no reason, revolted and banished him to Chiang Fòng. The people of Chiang Fòng, afraid that on his arrival the inhabitants would flee in all directions, had a secret discussion. They deceived him by saying that he would merely be settled at Moeng Nun.<sup>28</sup> They forced him on to the back of an elephant and transported him to Moeng Khòn,<sup>29</sup> where he was strangled to death. After the decease of Tao Kü Moeng, he became the deity of the moeng (süa moeng or phi moeng) and so until the present day oblations must be offered to him yearly. It was in the year CS 777, dap-met [1415CE]. He was the tenth ruler [of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Located to the south of present-day Menghai County (Moeng Hai), previously Fohai County.

<sup>28</sup> Also known as Xiao Menglun (Lesser Moeng Nun), now a part of Zhenyue County. According to Dao & Kang, in the year CS 785 (1433 CE), Tao Kham Tiat banished Tao Kü Moeng to Fade (in lower Ban Fa of Moeng Ham) and nominated Tao Sòng Moeng, the four-year-old second son of Tao Kü Moeng, to succeed his father. Dao Yongming 刀 永 明 & Kanglang Zhuang 康 朗 莊 "Cheli xuanwei shi shixi ji liyi dashi ji" 車 里 宣 慰 使 世 系 及 禮 儀 大 事 記 [Genealogy of the Saenwi Fa of Sipsòng Panna and records of important events on ceremonies], in Cheli xuanwei shi shixi jijie 車 里 宣 慰 使 世 系 集 解 [Collections of commentaries on the genealogies of Saenwi Fa of Sipsòng Panna] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1989): pp. 328.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> To the southeast of Ganlanba (i.e., Moeng Ham), south of Chiang Rung.

Moeng Lü].

A very similar account is given in the 1963-Tai Lü and Gao Lishi (1984). According to Gao Lishi:

When Tao Kü Moeng was in power, he neither ruled according to law nor followed the ancestral injunctions. [He] was cruel and unscrupulous and killed people recklessly/wantonly. [He] invented instruments for torturing, [such as] the hay cutter and saw to cut and saw [people] to death, or an iron hook to hook into the culprit's spinal cord and the bone so as to hang him up; or slicing a piece of flesh per day until he died. When a person committed a crime, his siblings and relatives would be [implicated in the crime and] killed. [Tao Kü Moeng] refused to listen to the advice of Süa Luang Fa and others. Süa Luang Fa, afraid that he would be killed by him, sought refuge in Moeng Cae and Moeng Hun. In the third year of Tao Kü Moeng's reign, as his younger brother Tao Kham Tet (Tiat) was afraid that he would be murdered by [his brother] he ousted him in the year CS 798, lai-si [1436 CE] and sent him to live at Ban Chiang Fòng of Chiang Rung [which is today's Ban Chiang Pòm]. Later, the people had a secret discussion. If he were to regain his power, they would be killed by him. They then cheated him by telling him that they were sending him to Moeng Nun. They brought Tao Kü Moeng by force on to the back of an elephant and transported him to Moeng Khòn, where he was strangled to death with a rope around his neck. He became a phi moeng after his death and every year oblations were offered, which was observed to the present day.

We learn of this in the contemporary Chinese sources:

In the year Yongle 11, 11th month, on wu-xu day (Dec. 15, 1413), the emperor sent palace eunuch, Hong Zai-sheng 洪 仔 生, to bring an imperial decree to Dao Xian-da (Tao Sida Kham). On arrival [the imperial envoy learned that] Dao Xian-

da (Tao Sida Kham) had passed away and his eldest son Dao Geng-meng 刀 更 孟 (Tao Kü Moeng, r. 1413–1415) proclaimed himself [ruler]. He, who was arrogant and cruel, could not gain the hearts of his people. He died not long after (murdered). Dao Geng-meng's eldest son, Dao Ba-xian 刀 霸 羨 (Tao Phasaeng) (sic)<sup>30</sup> succeeded [him to the post of *Saenwi Fa*]. As he was young, the people (the nobility) elected Dao Sai 刀 賽 (Tao Sai) to be the deputy of the aboriginal commission. Dao Sai was namely Dao Pa-han 刀 怕 漢 (i.e., Tao Kham Tet), the younger brother of Dao Geng-meng (Tao Kü Moeng). After the death of Dao Pa-han, his (Tao Kü Moeng) wife deceitfully claimed that Dao Long 刀 弄 (Tao Luang),<sup>31</sup> her former husband's son, was the grandson of Dao Xian-da (Tao Sida Kham) and petitioned to allow [Dao Long] to succeed to [the post of *Saenwi Fa*]. It was approved.<sup>32</sup>

According to the *Veritable Records*, in Yongle 11, 11<sup>th</sup> month (1413), the second son of the late Pacification Commissioner Dao Xian-da (Tao Sida Kham), Dao Sai (Tao Sai), sent his elder brother Dao Pa-long 刀 怕 弄 (Tao Pha Luang) and others to pay tribute to the Ming court, presenting elephants, horses, gold and silver utensils. According to the *Ming Shilu*:

Earlier, the Ming court sent palace eunuch Hong Zai-sheng, bringing with him an imperial decree, brocades and other things, [to Cheli]. On arrival he found out that Dao Xian-da was already dead and his eldest son Dao Gen-meng 刀 艮 孟 (viz. 刀 更 孟), who was arrogant and cruel, had succeeded to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> According to Tai Lü chronicles, Tao Phasaeng was Süa Luang Fa's eldest son. Tao Kü Moeng eldest son was Tao Bakòng.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> According to Li Fuyi's (1947) *Leshi*, Dao Xian-da had four sons: 1. Dao Gengmeng (Tao Kü Moeng), 2. Dao Kang-liang (Tao Kham Tet/Tiat), 3. Xiang Nang (Saeng Nang), and 4. the adopted son, She Long Fa (Süa Luang Fa), who was his nephew (Peo Fai Fa's 3<sup>rd</sup> son). In this case, who was Dao Long (Tao Luang)? Could he be Süa Luang Fa, the grandson of Tao Sida Kham?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Mingshi Gao 189, 31a, translated by the present writer.

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the post himself. He could not gain the hearts of his people. Not long afterwards he died from illness. The people supported Dao Sai to take over the post for the time being. Dao Pa-long thanked the Ming court for the kindness shown to his deceased father and begged for permission to succeed to the post, which was approved.<sup>33</sup>

However, we do not know if Tao Kü Moeng was really a cruel king or whether he was killed by the general population or by the Tai Lü nobility. It could be that was killed as a result of intrigue by his younger brother, Tao Kham Tet, and his cousin, Süa Luang Fa. Both men were also anxious to remove Tao Kü Moeng's sons.

### Tao Kü Moeng Ousts His Nephews Tao Sòng Moeng and Tao Bakòng

Tao Kü Moeng had three sons: Tao Bakòng, Tao Sòng Moeng and Tao Sam Pò Lütai. They were still young when their father was murdered, allegedly by the people at Moeng Khòn. Tao Sam Pò Lütai was still a baby and his two elder brothers were still in their teens. Tao Sòng Moeng (r. 1415–1416/ bet. 1436–1439) succeeded his father to the throne, but sat on it for only two and a half months before his uncle, Tao Kham Tet, ousted him.

After Tao Kü Moeng had been banished and killed, [his] second son Tao Sòng Moeng was enthroned.<sup>34</sup> Meanwhile [his] eldest son Tao Bakòng had already taken up his principality (*shiyi*) in Moeng Phong<sup>35</sup> for three years when he heard that Tao Sòng Moeng had been enthroned. Tao Bakòng and his mother had a private discussion and said: "According to the right [of primogeniture], the eldest son should succeed [his father]. Tao

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See *Taizong Shilu* 145, 1717 (Yongle 11, 11<sup>th</sup> month, wu-xu day: Dec. 15, 1413), translated by the present writer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> According to Gao Lishi (1984) (13.1) and 1963-Tai Lü (13.1), Tao Sòng Moeng was thirteen years old when he succeeded his father.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Tao Bakòng was the lord of Moeng Phong, which is located ca. thirty-six kilometres west of Meng La (Moeng La), on the east bank of the Mekong River.

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Bakòng is the elder. For what reason, instead of Tao Bakòng, has Tao Sòng Moeng been enthroned as [ruler]?" [They] were upset. Tao Sòng Moeng assumed the throne of [his elder brother], but was on the throne for [only] two months and fifteen days before being ousted by [his uncle] Tao Kham Tet (Tiat). As the people found what Tao Kham Tet had done was unfair, they drove him away not long afterwards (Li Fuyi, 1947).

But, according to Gao Lishi (1984) and the 1963-Tai Lü, Tao Bakòng returned to Chiang Rung to reclaim the throne. He ruled less than three more years until his uncle, Tao Kham Tet, deposed him. According to Gao Lishi:

Tao Sòng Moeng succeeded his father to the throne at the age of thirteen years. He was still young. His elder brother Tao Bakòng was at his principality (kin na) in Moeng Phong. As the mother and son learned of the news that the younger brother [Tao] Sòng Moeng had succeeded to the throne, they discussed [and thought that] according to the right [of primogeniture] the elder son ought to succeed in his father's stead. They returned to Chiang Rung forthwith. Tao Sòng Moeng waited for his elder brother three months and fifteen days before Tao Bakòng returned to Chiang Rung. Tao Bakòng succeeded in his younger brother's stead at the age of fifteen years in the year CS 801, kat-met (1439 CE). [His throne] was usurped by his uncle Tao Kham Tet in the year CS 803, hong-lao (1441 CE).

Meanwhile, Süa Luang Fa, another powerful uncle of the three youths of Tao Kü Moeng, was waiting in Moeng Cae and Moeng Hun, the two polities located to the west of the Mekong River, closer to Moeng Laem, where his maternal grandfather was living. Tao Kham Tet (Tiat), who could not gain the support of the people, asked his cousin Süa Luang Fa to surrender to him and sought his support. Süa Luang Fa refused with the following words:

Nobody has communicated with me concerning matters of dethronement and enthronement until now. When my father, the King (i.e., Tao Sida Kham), was on the throne, all local matters were placed under my administration. To my astonishment, immediately after the death of my father, the King, those men have created a state of confusion in the land. It is as dark as if there were no sun in the sky (i.e., lawlessness). Moreover, they put pressure on me, but I cannot be partial to the left or to the right (Li Fuyi, 1947).

Another version of Tai Lü chronicles records a very similar account:

As for [the matter of] deposing Tao Bakòng I am not aware of it. Neither do I know about the appointment of Tao Kham Tet. When my elder uncle Cao Sida Kham was on the throne, the administration of all local matters was entrusted to me personally. Now [my] father, the king is dead. The land is thrown into such a state of chaos by you all, dark as if there were no sun in the sky. [You] intend to proclaim yourself king and succeed to the throne; yet you want my support and me to go to pay you homage. [You indulge] in vain hope (Gao Lishi, 1984).

Süa Luang Fa, being the adopted son and son-in-law of Tao Sida Kham,<sup>36</sup> saw himself as the rightful successor to the throne of *Cao Phaendin* (lord of the land). He refused to obey his cousin, Tao Kham Tet, who had deposed his elder brother, Tao Kü Moeng, and his two young nephews. War between the two cousins, Tao Kham Tet and Süa Luang Fa, was inevitable.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Süa Luang Fa married Tao Sida Kham's daughter, Nang Lun Koei, who was the granddaughter of Cao Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung).

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The War Between the Two Cousins, Tao Kham Tet and Süa Luang Fa

Tao Kham Tet (r. 1415–1428/1442–1445) was invested as the lord of Na Mün Paen. Süa Luang Fa (r. 1428–1457/1446–1466) was the lord of Moeng Phong (to the east of the Mekong River). Süa Luang Fa gained three more *panna* of land in Moeng Hun and Moeng Hai after marrying Tao Sida Kham's daughter, Nang Lun Koei. Thus, Süa Luang Fa moved to Moeng Cae and Moeng Hun to the west of the Mekong River and closer to Moeng Laem. This was accomplished after the death of Tao Sida Kham, but before Tao Kham Tet had deposed his elder brother, Tao Kü Moeng. The Chronicles of Tai Lü describe Süa Luang Fa as intelligent, resourceful and brave. According to Li Fuyi (1947):

Süa Luang Fa, the third son of Peo Fai Fa, was intelligent, resourceful and brave. When he was young, Tao Sida Kham adopted him and brought him up as his own son. [He] was granted Moeng Phong as his principality<sup>37</sup> and appointed military commander, concurrently entrusted with the task of managing all the local affairs.

Süa Luang Fa refused to submit to his cousin, Tao Kham Tet. Thus, the angry Tao Kham Tet rallied the lords of the various *moeng* (polities) in the Upper Mekong River area<sup>38</sup> to send troops to attack Süa Luang Fa in Ban Cae at Moeng Hun, where Süa Luang Fa's troops were garrisoned. Süa Luang Fa pretended to ignore his cousin and declared that he was going to wait for his attack. Meanwhile he sought help from his maternal grandparents in Moeng Laem. The lord of Moeng Laem, Phaya Hom Fa,<sup>39</sup> sent his younger brother Kham Ham Fa<sup>40</sup> to rescue his grandson.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Süa Luang Fa was invested as the lord of Moeng Phong, located in the former Zhenyue County, now Mengla County, east of the Mekong River.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> According to Li Fuyi (1947), Tao Kham Tet mustered soldiers and men from the east of the Mekong River.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> According to the 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle (15.3) and Gao Lishi (1984), p. 109, he was called Phaya Phai Hom Fa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Kham Ham Fa later married Nang O (Ua) Ming Khai Foei and became the son-in-law of Süa Luang Fa.

Kham Ham Fa led the troops of Moeng Laem and marched to reinforce his nephew, Süa Luang Fa. According to Gao Lishi (1984), it was in the year CS 808 (1445 CE), but according to Li Fuyi (1947), it was in the year CS 790 (1428 CE):

In CS 790 [1428 CE], they fought at Moeng Hun.<sup>41</sup> Defeated, Tao Kham Tet fled to the couch grass (lalang grass) in the field. Kham Ham Fa was wounded by seven arrows. Süa Luang Fa captured one elephant and pursued [the enemy] to Chiang Lan.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, all the places (i.e., *moeng* and *ban*) capitulated. Tao Kham Tet fled to a high land (hillock) in Chiang Ha.<sup>43</sup> This place was thus known as Còm Süa by the people (Li Fuyi, 1947).

A more vivid account is given in Gao Lishi (1984):

Tao Kham Tet marched to attack [Süa Luang Fa], and Süa Luang Fa encountered the enemy. In the fierce fighting at Hae Na Kha, although Kham Ham Fa from Moeng Laem was wounded in seven places, the elephant ridden by Tao Kham Tet was captured by Süa Luang Fa. Defeated Tao Kham Tet escaped back [to Chiang Lan] and Süa Luang Fa taking the advantage of victory, pursued [his cousin] to Chiang Lan. The people of Chiang Lan were on the side of Süa Luang Fa. Tao Kham Tet had no standing (no support), fled to a hillock of Chiang Ha. Again Süa Lüang Fa pursued him to a hillock of Chiang Ha, where he killed a close and trusted headman of Tao Kham Tet. This place is therefore renamed Còm Süa. Every year oblations were offered, which was observed to the present day.

Not long afterwards, Tao Kham Tet took the golden seal adorned with a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> According to the 1963-Tai Lü (15.4) and Gao Lishi (1984), p. 109, the battlefield was at Hae Na Kha,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Located three *li* (ca. 1 ½ kilometres) to the east of Cheli (Chiang Rung).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Located to the south of Chiang Rung.

tiger's head and the golden warrant and sought help from Chinese authorities in Moeng La (Simao) and Kunming. Enroute, he died by the bank of the Nam Thai Fan River. The victorious Süa Luang Fa ascended the throne and became the lord of Moeng Lü, according to Li Fuyi (1947), in CS 790 (1428 CE), but according to Gao Lishi (1984) in CS 808 (1446 CE).

After Kham Ham Fa from Moeng Laem had helped Süa Lüang Fa in the battle against his cousin, Tao Kham Tet, he intended to take his troops back to Moeng Laem. However, Süa Luang Fa persuaded him to remain in Moeng Lü. As Süa Luang Fa argued,

In this military campaign you have gained more merit. Moeng Laem is just a small land. The domain of Moeng Lü is several times larger than Moeng Laem (Li Fuyi, 1947).

Similarly, Gao Lishi (1984) records:

In this military campaign [you my] brother[-in-law] (sic) have shown outstanding achievements. It is you who have fought and seized the land for me to enjoy. Moeng Laem is a small land. Moeng Lü-Saenwi Fa in comparison with Moeng Laem is countless times larger.

Consequently, he conferred on Kham Ham Fa the grant of a large rice-field [na mün luang, literally "10,000 rice field"] and offered his daughter, Nang O (Ua) Ming Khai Foei (eldest daughter), to Kham Ham Fa as his consort. Kham Ham Fa then remained in Moeng Lü.

According to Li Fuyi (1947), the fratricidal war between the two cousins lasted fifteen years (1413 to 1428) before peace was restored during Süa Luang Fa's reign. Süa Luang Fa was on the throne for a total of thirty years before passing away at the age of eighty in the year CS 819 (1457 CE). According to Gao Lishi (1984), however, the war only lasted for three years (1442–1445).

After removing his cousin, Tao Kham Tet, Süa Luang Fa still felt unsafe on the throne because the three sons of Tao Kü Moeng —Tao Bakòng, Tao Sòng Moeng and Sam Pò Lütai— had not yet been

eliminated. He was probably afraid of the youths' maternal granduncle from Moeng Khün.44 By right of primogeniture, Tao Kü Moeng's eldest son, Tao Bakong, should have been restored to the throne after the usurper, Tao Kham Tet, had been driven away. But Süa Luang Fa had no intention of restoring his nephew to the throne. Instead, Süa Luang Fa strengthened and legitimated his position by marrying Tao Kü Moeng's wife, Nang Aen Kòm (daughter of Tao Hin Pan). Not long afterwards, Süa Luang Fa elevated Nang Aen Kòm to the position of principal queen and banished Tao Bakóng and Tao Sòng Moeng by putting them on a raft and letting them drift down the Mekong River. Süa Luang Fa also wanted to kill his nephew, Sam Pò Lütai, but the latter's mother intervened by threatening to commit suicide. Thus, Sam Pò Lütai's life was spared and Süa Luang Fa adopted him. Sam Pò Lütai grew up to accumulate significant power after the death of his unclecum-stepfather, Süa Luang Fa. He fought for his father's throne against Süa Luang Fa's sons. This is documented in the Tai Lü chronicles:

Süa Luang Fa took Nang Aen Kòm, the mother of Tao Bakòng and Tao Sòng Moeng, to be his royal concubine (fei) and later promoted her to be the queen consort (nang tewi or nang moeng). The two brothers, Tao Bakòng and Tao Sòng Moeng, were afraid that the people might support Süa Luang Fa, who wanted to harm them. So they boarded a raft and fled down the Mekong River. At that time Tao Sam Pò Lütai was still young. Süa Luang Fa wanted to kill him, but his mother, Nang Aen Kòm, protested and said: "My two elder sons have been murdered. My present situation is indeed extremely sad. If [Your Lord] must kill all the brothers, then I am no longer willing to be your queen. I will use a sharp knife to poke my throat and kill myself. It would be better to die than to live." As a result, Tao Sam Pò Lütai's life was spared (Li Fuyi, 1947).

A more vivid account is given in Gao Lishi (1984):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Tao Sida Kham, the grandfather of the three youths, married the younger sister of Cao Moeng Khün. Thus, the maternal granduncle of the three youths was from Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung in Burma).

[As] Sam Pò Lütai, the third brother of Tao Bakòng and Tao Sòng Moeng, was still young, he was still with his mother. Süa Luang Fa also did not want to spare him. His mother said to Süa Luang Fa: "My two elder sons have been sent away by you on a raft. It is like having killed [them]. I am already extremely sad. If you still want to kill the youngest brother, then I am no longer willing to be the queen mother. I will kill myself by stabbing a small dagger into my throat; death is more dignified than staying alive." Süa Luang Fa ordered [her] to bring Sam Pò Lütai to show him. Indeed [the baby nephew] had just learned to walk (i.e., just a toddler). Süa [Luang Fa] pondered: "[This baby] will not be able to plot to usurp my throne." And thus [the small life] had a narrow escape from death.

Although the Ming officials might have muddled up their names and relationships, the Ming court was aware of the unrest in Moeng Lü. According to the *Ming Shilu*:

In the year Yongle 15, 2nd month, on wu-wu day (Feb. 17, 1417), Dao Long 刀弄 (Tao Luang), who was the grandson (sic) of the aboriginal official (i.e., Saenwi Fa) Dao Xian-da 刀運答 (Tao Sida Kham), and others came to pay tribute and presented horses. The Ministry of Rites received an order to give them a feast and confer on them presents. On ji-wei day (Feb. 18), following the petition of the natives, a decree was issued ordering Dao Long (Tao Luang), the grandson (sic) of the late Pacification Commissioner (i.e., Saenwi Fa) of Cheli Dao Xian-da (Tao Sida Kham), to succeed to the post and be the Pacification Commissioner. Dao Shuang-meng 刀雙孟 (Tao Sòng Moeng) who was the second son (zhongzi) of Dao Gengmeng 刀更孟 (Tao Kü Moeng), was to be the Vice-Pacification Commissioner (i.e., Upalaca). 45

 $<sup>^{45}</sup>$  Taizong Shilu 185, 1981 (Yongle 15,  $2^{nd}$  month, wu-wu and ji-wei days).

According to the Tai Lü chronicles, Tao Sida Kham did not have a grandson called Tao Luang. If Tao Luang were Süa Luang Fa, then Tao Luang was Tao Sida Kham's nephew. If Tao Luang were Tao Kham Tet, then he was Tao Sida Kham's second son. Thus, the uncle (Tao Kham Tet or Süa Luang Fa) and nephew (Tao Sòng Moeng) were both recognised by the Ming court as aboriginal officials (tuguan). According to the Ming Shilu:

In the year Yongle 19, 1st month, on jia-shen day (Feb. 22, 1421), the Pacification Commission and Commissioner of Jingan (靖安宣慰使司) (in Moeng Phong)<sup>46</sup> of Cheli in Yunnan was established. Previously, two aboriginal officials (tuguan) for the Military-cum-Civilian Pacification Commission of Cheli were appointed, [viz.] Dao Long 刀弄 (Tao Luang) was the Pacification Commissioner and his uncle (sic) Dao Shuangmeng 刀雙孟 (Tao Sòng Moeng) was the Vice-Pacification Commissioner. Until then, Dao Shuang-meng said: "Dao Long has repeatedly resorted to using troops to invade and loot. The tribal peoples (man min) are disturbed and could not live in peace. [I] entreat that a separate office be established in another location [for me] to pacify [and rule my] people." It was approved. The land [of Cheli] was partitioned for establishing the Pacification Commission of Jing-an (Moeng Phong). Dao Shuang-meng was promoted to be the Pacification Commissioner. The Ministry of Rites (libu) received an order to cast an official seal for him.<sup>47</sup>

Eight years later, we learn from the following from the Ming Shilu:

In the year Xuande 3, 12<sup>th</sup> month, on *yi-wei* day (Jan. 22, 1429), the Provincial Administrator of Yunnan (*buzheng shi*) Cha Hong-yi 差 洪 益 submitted a memorial: "On account that the

<sup>47</sup> Taizu Shilu 233, 2254 (Yongle 19, 1, st jia-shen day).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> In southern Zhenyue County, to the east of the Mekong River, near Laos.

Pacification Commissioner of Cheli Dao Long 刀弄 (Tao Luang) fought against his fellow clansman (zushu 族 叔),<sup>48</sup> the Pacification Commissioner of Jing-an<sup>49</sup> Dao Shuang-meng 刀雙 孟 (Tao Sòng Moeng), out of blood feud, he abandoned his land and defected to Laos. I entreat that an official should be sent to accompany me to pacify (zhaofu) him [to persuade him to return to his allegiance]." The emperor told the Ministers (shangshu) Hu Ying 胡 瀅, Zhang Ben 張本, and others: "It is a common affair that the barbarian peoples (manyı) kill one another out of blood feuds. How could we always listen to what the petty people say? You should tell the Duke of Qianguo (Mu Sheng 沐 晟) to deliberate for a solution with the Three Provincial Offices (sansı) and deal with the problem."<sup>50</sup>

The partition of Moeng Lü resulted from the harrassment of Tao Sòng Moeng, the second son of Tao Kü Moeng, by his uncle. This is documented in Chinese reign chronicles of the time.

Süa Luang Fa Plotted to Kill his Cousin, Cao Ai

Cao Ai was Süa Luang Fa's uncle Tao Kumman's son. Süa Luang Fa had incorporated Moeng Kla (Ka), Moeng Bò, and Moeng Pan (in present-day Jinggu),<sup>51</sup> into the domain of Sipsòng Panna. This was in the year CS 819 (1457 CE). Süa Luang Fa appointed Cao Ai of Moeng Hing (Puwen) as governor of Moeng Bò, Moeng Kla, and Moeng Pan. He also appointed Cao Ai's younger brother, Tao Yi, as Governor of Moeng Hing (Puwen). Later, as Cao Ai could not adapt himself to his new *moeng*, he returned to Chiang Rung. The Council of Nobles (*nüa sanam*) sent him to take up his principality at Na Saen of Chiang Lan. He attempted to go against Süa Luang Fa. Thus, Süa Lüang Fa plotted to kill him. He

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> A felllow clansman of one's father's generation, but younger than one's father.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Jing-an was located in Meng Peng (Moeng Phong), ca. thirty-six kilometres west of Moeng La, in Zhenyue County. It could be in Moeng Sing in Laos.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Xuanzong Shilu 49, 1187 (Xuande 3, 12<sup>th</sup> month, yi-wei day).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Jinggu is located to the northwest of Simao, to the east of the Mekong.

asked Man Còm Hai to invite Cao Ai (then Cao Saen of Chiang Lan) to go with him to catch and eat fish. After Cao Ai had come, Man Còm Hai went to cast the net. Pretending that he had seen a big fish, he told Cao Ai to go into the water to catch it because he had better luck. As soon as Cao Ai dove into the water, the party cast their nets. Cao Ai, entangled in the nets, drowned in the deep pond.<sup>52</sup> This was how Süa Luang Fa removed his cousin who did not want to be the lord of an outer *moeng* (polity) to the far north of Chiang Rung.

# The Fourth Fratricidal Conflict

The fourth fratricidal conflict was fought between between Tao Sam Pò Lütai and the sons of Süa Luang Fa. According to Li Fuyi (1947), Süa Luang Fa was on the throne thirty years and died at the age of eighty in CS 819 (1457 CE). According to Gao Lishi (1984), however, Süa Luang Fa was on the throne for twenty years and died at the age of eighty in CS 828 (1466 CE). His eldest son, Tao Phasaeng (Dao Ba-xian), was enthroned in the same year. He was ousted just two months later, allegedly because the people refused to submit to him. Tao Phasaeng then fled to China. Enroute, he suddenly committed suicide by cutting his throat at Moeng Hing (Puwen). According to contemporary Chinese sources, however, Tao Phasaeng was murdered by his cousin, Tao Sam Pò Lütai. The *Ming Shilu* relates, for example,

In the year Tianshun 1, 2nd month, on *geng-shen* day (21 March 1457), the Regional Commander (*zong bingguan*) of Yunnan-cum-the Vice-Commissioner-in-chief (*dudu tongzhi*), Mu Lin 沐 璘, submitted a joint memorial: "The Pacification Commissioner (*xuanwei shi*) of the Military-cum-Civilian Pacification Commission of Cheli (Moeng Lü), Dao Ba-xian 刀 霸 羨 (Tao Phasaeng), had committed suicide. … [."] The emperor replied: San Bao Lidai (Sam Pò Lütai), a son of a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Gao Lishi (1984), p. 112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> But according to Gao Lishi (1984), Tao Phasaeng was enthroned in CS 828 (1466 CE) and he ruled five months before the people ousted him.

concubine (*shunie*), has usurped [the post] of the son of a legal consort (*di*) and murdered (*mouhai*) Dao Ba-xian (Tao Phasaeng) [...]"<sup>54</sup>

According to Tai Lü sources, after Tao Phasaeng had committed suicide by cutting his throat, the people looked for an appropriate ruler but could not find one. Therefore, a proclamation was sent to various moeng (polities) informing the cao mòm (lord of a moeng) that the people ought to have the freedom to elect their own ruler. The deposal of Tao Phasaeng was to establish a precedent. Whoever was not needed would be ousted; whoever was needed would be supported and installed as ruler. The result of this election was that Tao Sam Pò Lütai was elected as the new Cao Phaendin (lord of Moeng Lü). Tao Còm Pha and the rest of the brothers of Tao Phasaeng were not nominated. The youngest son of Tao Kü Moeng, Tao Sam Pò Lütai (r. 1457–1497/1467–1490), thus regained the Saenwi Fa throne of his father. The reason Sam Pò Lütai was preferred by the nobility could have been favor of the right of primogeniture. As Sam Pò Lütai was the son of Tao Kü Moeng, this would have made him the rightful lord of Moeng Lü after his two elder brothers<sup>55</sup> were deposed by his uncle, Tao Kham Tet (Tiat).

Tao Còm Pha's and Tao Ut's Collusion with Phaya Tiloka Against their Cousin, Tao Sam Pò Lütai

During Tao Sam Pò Lütai's reign, there was no peace in Moeng Lü. He had to fight hard to overcome the power of his cousins, namely the surviving sons of Süa Luang Fa, who rallied foreign troops to help them oust Tao Sam Pò Lütai, who probably had ordered the killing of the heir Tao Phasaeng, their eldest brother.

Thus, in the year CS 820 (1458 CE), the two brothers, the lord of Moeng Luang, Tao Còm Pha, and the lord of Moeng Hun, Tao Ut, hatched a plot.<sup>56</sup> They went to Lan Na to invite Phaya Tilaka<sup>57</sup> to join

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Yingzong Shilu 275, 5860 (Tianshun 1, 2<sup>nd</sup>, month, geng-shen day).

<sup>55</sup> The story says that Tao Bakòng was the founder of Chiang Khaeng/Moeng Sing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> They were the second and sixth sons of Süa Luang Fa.

forces with them to attack Tao Sam Pò Lütai. Sam Pò Lütai abandoned Chiang Lan and moved to Chiang Rung. Phaya Tilaka commanded 200,000 soldiers and took the Lord of Moeng Luang Tao Còm Pha as his guide. They advanced to Moeng Cae. On the pretext that Saen Lò (i.e., Mün Luang Saen Lò)<sup>58</sup> of Moeng Cae had taken Tao Sam Pò Lütai as his son-in-law, Phaya Tilaka of Lan Na marched directly to attack Moeng Cae.

[Five years] after Sam Pò Lütai had ascended the throne, in the year CS 834 [1472 CE], Cao Moeng Long<sup>59</sup> and Cao Moeng Hun<sup>60</sup> Ban Wan<sup>61</sup> colluded with Phaya Tiloka from Lan Na-Chiang Mai to attack Sam Pò Lütai. Sam Pò Lütai, forced to abandon Chiang Lan, went to build "Wiang Chiang Mu" [city of Chiang Mu]. Phaya Tiloka of Lan Na commanded a large force of 200,000 soldiers. Taking Cao Moeng Luang, Tao Còm Pha [the second son of Süa Luang Fa], as his guide, they marched to attack Moeng Cae. As Cao Moeng Luang and Cao Moeng Cae, called Saen Lò, had a personal feud, Cao Moeng Luang pointed out that Cao Moeng Cae and Sam Pò Lütai were of one mind. Saen Lò was the husband of Tao Còm Pha's younger sister and Tao [Còm Pha] was his elder uncle. Both Saen Lò's wife and Cao Moeng Luang, Tao Còm Pha, were Süa Luang Fa's children.<sup>62</sup> Cao Moeng Luang said: "You are the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> He was King Tilok, i.e., Phaya Tilokalaca (r. 1441–1487), a son of Sam Fang Kaen (1402–1441) and grandson of Saen Moeng Ma (r. 1385–1401).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Saen Lò was namely Kham Ham Fa, the younger brother of Phaya Lum Fa, who was the chieftain of Moeng Laem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> The second son of Süa Luang Fa, Tao Còm Pha, was the lord of Moeng Luang. Thus, he was Cao Moeng Luang.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> The sixth son of Süa Luang Fa, Tao Ut, was the lord of Moeng Hun.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Ban Wan is probably a Tai Lü word not translated by Gao Lishi (1984). In the 1963-Tai Lü (18.2), it is, "Cao Moeng Luang and Cao Moeng Hun rebelled and colluded with Phaya Tiloka from Lan Na-Chiang Mai (Kalòm) to attack Sam Pò Lütai."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> According to Gao Lishi (1984), Süa Luang Fa's eldest daughter, Nang Ua Ming Khai Foei, was married to Saen Moeng Cae, Kham Ham Fa. But according to Li Fuyi (1947), the eldest daughter of Süa Luang Fa was married to Mün Luang Saen Lò, Kham Ham Fa. The fratricidal wars continued among the next generation.

husband of my younger sister (i.e., brother-in-law), yet you are against me' (Gao Lishi, 1984).

Moeng Cae was unprepared for such an attack, as the city was not fortified. So they used bamboo-poles to quickly make a defensive wall around the town, and hung white cloth and other materials over the bamboo poles to give the appearance of fortifications. Saen Lò employed a ruse to ward off the imminent attack. He told Phaya Tilaka that the Saen Lò senior had gone to Chiang Rung. If Cao Lan Na could defeat Chiang Rung, Moeng Cae would surrender. Phaya Tilaka then transferred his troops to attack Chiang Rung. During this time Saen Ló quickly built proper fortifications at Moeng Cae. Within twenty days, they had completed the fortifications including a moat around the city.

Phaya Tilaka marched to attack Chiang Rung; but after one month and twenty days of siege, he still could not capture it. Thus, he pulled his troops back to attack Moeng Cae. He then besieged and attacked Moeng Cae. Nevertheless, after another one month and twenty days, he could not capture it, either. So he withdrew his troops quietly. Phaya Tilaka stopped at Moeng Yòng for a long time before he dared to travel back to Chiang Mai in Lan Na.

The Phaya of Moeng Khün (Lord of Chiang Tung), Sili Sutthamma Laca, led his troops to reinforce his grandnephew. Thus, after the war, Tao Sam Pò Lütai rewarded him by ceding Moeng Ma and Moeng La Tip to the Phaya of Moeng Khün.

Tao Sam Pò Lütai then appointed Mün Nòn Luang, who was the *lam kha kao*, 63 to recruit his people (the *kha kao*) to attack Lan Na and enlisted four thousand men. In the attack, Lan Na lost a great number of elephants and horses and many people were killed or wounded. Phaya Tilaka returned to Lan Na. The lord of Moeng Luang, Tao Còm Pha, and the lord of Moeng Hun, Tao Ut, defected.

In the year CS 824 (1462 CE), the lord of Moeng Ngat and Moeng Khang, Tao Cet (i.e., Tao Som, the seventh son of Süa Luang Fa), sought help from Phaya Tilaka of Lan Na. Phaya Tilaka entrusted the lords of Chiang Saen and of Chiang Rai to recruit forty thousand soldiers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> According to Li Fuyi (1947), p. 14, "lanjia" (lam kha kao) was the speaker or the representative stationed at the capital, i.e., Chiang Rung.

to escort Tao Cet from Moeng Lü to Lan Na. At that time, Moeng Yòng was desolate. Thus, Tao Cet and his men were resettled in Moeng Yòng. After this, Moeng Yòng was subordinate to Lan Na. Moeng Ngat and Moeng Khang were depopulated because the people followed Tao Cet to Moeng Yòng.

In the year CS 830 (1468 CE), Tao Sam Pò Lütai attacked Moeng Hun because the lord of Moeng Hun, Tao Ut (the sixth son of Süa Luang Fa), had colluded with Nan Lan and created trouble. Tao Ut fled to his elder brother in Muang Luang (the second son of Süa Luang Fa, Tao Còm Pha). Tao Sam Pò Lütai sent his men to persuade the scattered refugees to return to their homes, but the people of Moeng Hun erected huts in the fields and refused to return to their original homes. Tao Sam Pò Lütai could do nothing. The people of Moeng Hun invited Tao Ut back to Moeng Hun to rule over them.

In the year CS 831 (1469 CE), Tao Ut revolted again. Phaya Kham Daeng (viz. Saen Kham Daeng) launched another attack on Moeng Hun, killed Tao Ut, and presented his head to Tao Sam Pò Lütai. Tao Sam Pò Lütai had the people of Moeng Hun deported because they should not have invited Tao Ut back. One group was deported to Chiang Rung and another group to Moeng Cae. Thus, Moeng Hun was left desolate.

The fight for the throne and the unrest in Moeng Lü are clearly recorded in contemporary Chinese sources. As the *Ming Shilu* relates:

In the year Tianshun 1, 2nd month, on geng-shen day (March 21, 1457), the Regional Commander (zong bingguan) of Yunnancum-the Vice-Commissioner-in-chief (dudu tongzhi), Mu Lin 沐 ioint memorial: "The 璘、 submitted a Pacification Commissioner (xuanwei shi) of the Military-cum-Civilian Pacification Commission of Cheli (Moeng Lü), Dao Ba-xian 刀 霸 羨 (Tao Phasaeng), had committed suicide. The younger brothers Ban-ya Zhong 板 雅 忠 (Phaya Còm), et al., have already elected their elder brother San Bao Lidai 三 實 歷 代 (Tao Sam Pò Lütai) to rule the land on behalf of them. Now Ban-ya Zhong (Phaya Còm) is again creating unrest and banding together with Babai (Lan Na). He is borrowing men and horses [from Babai] and killing out of vengeance (blood feuds). We intend to transfer government troops to pacify and quell [the revolt] but the warm spring is approaching and the epidemic attributed to miasma is flourishing. We should not yet mobilise the troops and march on recklessly. The emperor replied: "San Bao Lidai (Sam Pò Lütai), a son of a concubine (shunie), has usurped [the post] of the son of a legal consort [di] and murdered [mouhai] Dao Ba-xian [Tao Phasaeng], prompting Ban-ya Zhong (Phaya Còm) to borrow troops [from Babai] to attack and kill [him]. [Mu] Lin and others should send suitable officials to pacify and instruct Ban-ya Zhong [Phaya Còm], et al., and make an investigation to find out who is the legal heir of the post of the Pacification Commissioner [Saenwi Fa]. The causes of the succession conflict are to be reported and they should be ordered to withdraw their forces and settle their conflicts.<sup>64</sup>

More than a year later, the results of the investigation were reported to the Ming court. The Ming court found that Sam Pò Lütai was the son of Tao Kü Moeng and not the son of a concubine.

In the year Tianshun 2, 6th month, on *ren-shen* day (July 26, 1458), an order was issued to appoint the son of Dao Gengmeng 刀 更 孟 (Tao Kü Moeng), the late Pacification Commissioner of the Pacification Commission of Cheli, San Bao Lidai 三 寶 歷代 (Tao Sam Pò Lütai), to succeed his father to the post. At the beginning, after the death of Dao Geng-meng, San Bao Lidai's mother, née Jin 金 氏 (Kham clan), 65 married the headman (*toumu*) Dao Si-long 刀 思弄 (Cao Süa Luang, i.e., Süa Luang Fa), who took charge of the land of Cheli; and San Bo Lidai followed his mother [to his stepfather]. 66 After the death of Dao Si-long, his son Dao Ba-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Yingzong Shilu 275, 5860 (Tianshun 1, 2<sup>nd</sup>, geng-shen day). See above, page 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> According to Li Fuyi (1947), the mother of Sam Pò Lütai was Nang Aen Kòm, the daughter of Tao Hin Pan, who, after the death of her first husband, Tao Kü Moeng, married Süa Luang Fa (r. 1428–1457).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> In this case, She Long-fa 奢 隴 法 (Süa Luang Fa) was most probably Dao Silong (or Si Long-fa).

xian 刀霸羡 (Tao Phasaeng) hence succeeded to the post. After the death of Dao Ba-xian, the various yi (i.e., headmen of Moeng Lü) intended to recommend San Bao Lidai to succeed to the post. However, the younger brother of Dao Ba-xian, Ban-ya Zhong 板雅忠 (Phaya Còm), et al. objected to it. Consequently, he resorted to war and created unrest. The [Ming] court ordered the officials of the Three Provincial Offices (sansi guan) [in Yunnan] to go to pacify them. An investigation was made and the situation was clear; thus the order was given. 67

# The Fifth Fratricidal Conflict

The fifth fratricidal war took place within Tao Sam Pò Lütai's family and after Tao Sam Pò Lütai had ousted his cousins. As recorded in the Chronicles of Moeng Lü, Tao Sam Pò Lütai had six sons and four daughters: The eldest son, Tao Yi, was the crown prince (Cao Moeng Luk); the second son was Cao Moeng;<sup>68</sup> the third son, Sam Khai Noeng, was appointed military commander and granted Moeng U as his principality.<sup>69</sup> The fourth son, Cao Am, was granted Moeng Nun as his principality; the fifth son, Cao Ai, and the sixth son, Cao Khan Moeng, were still young and they were not yet appointed as lords of any principality.

In the year CS 832 (1470 CE), the younger brother of Phaya Khün, Cao Moeng Khak, married Tao Sam Pò Lütai's daughter, Nang Khò Moeng.<sup>70</sup> Tao Sam Pò Lütai asked Cao Moeng Khak to remain in Moeng

<sup>67</sup> Yingzong Shilu 292, 6242 (Tianshun 2, 6<sup>th</sup>, ren-shen day).

According to the 1963-Tai Lü, 18.11, he was called Cao Moeng Khak, i.e., Cao Am.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> It is namely Moeng U-Nüa, which was formally ceded to French Indochina in 1896. Together with Moeng U-Tae, they form the bulk of Laos' Phong Sali province where ethnic Lü still make up the majority among the Tai-speaking ethnic groups.

According to Li Fuyi (1947), Nang Khò Moeng was the third daughter of Tao Sam Pò Lütai; but according to the 1963-Tai Lü (18.14) and Gao Lishi (1984), p. 113, Cao Moeng Khak married the fifth daughter of Tao Sam Pò Lütai, Nang Khò Moeng.

Lü to serve him. The son-in-law of Tao Sam Pò Lütai was not a humble man, so conflicts between the crown prince, Cao Yi, and his brother-in-law escalated.

As the queen, the natural mother of Cao Ai and Cao Khan Moeng, wanted to set up her own son as crown prince and remove Cao Mòm Luk [i.e., the crown prince, Cao Yi], she slandered [the prince royal] to Tao Sam Pò Lütai: "The crown prince intends to commit regicide and establish himself as the ruler." Tao Sam Pò Lütai believed her and ordered Mün Luang<sup>71</sup> to attack Cao Mòm Luk (Li Fuyi, 1947).

[Tao Yi's] brother-in-law Cao Moeng Khak quickly ran to hide under the building of his father-in-law. At that time, the queen, namely the natural mother of Cao Ai [the fourth son] and the step-mother of Tao Yi, wanted to depose Tao Yi [so as] to nominate her son-in-law [as crown prince] and her daughter as queen. [She] said calumnious things about [Tao Yi] to Sam Pò Lütai and said that the crown prince Tao Yi was plotting regicide to usurp the throne. Sam Pò Lütai, without carefully considering [the slander] and after having heard only one-sided words, sent his eldest son-in-law called Mün Luang [Tao Saeo's son] to fight [Tao Yi] (Gao Lishi, 1984).

Tao Sam Pò Lütai believed the queen's slander and ordered his son-in-law Mün Luang<sup>72</sup> to attack Cao Mòm Luk (the crown prince, Cao Yi). However, Mün Luang defied the order because Cao Mòm Luk was innocent. Thus, the queen (*nang tewi*) bribed his brother, Phaya Kham Daeng, and confided to him her plot for removing the crown prince. Phaya Kkam Daeng had harboured a grudge against Cao Mòm Luk (i.e., Tao Yi) and hated him. After receiving the bribe from his sister, the queen, Phaya Kham Daeng attacked Cao Moeng Luk on the hill behind

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> This was the father of Tao Saeo, thus the father-in-law of the second daughter of Tao Sam Pò Lütai.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Mün Luang, the son of Tao Saeo (Süa Luang Fa's third son), was husband of Cao Nang. Thus, Mün Luang was the son-in-law of Tao Sam Pò Lütai.

the palace in Chiang Rung,<sup>73</sup> but could not win. Thus, Tao Sam Pò Lütai went to help his brother-in-law, Phaya Kham Daeng, to attack his own son. But Tao Yi avoided fighting his father. He fled to Moeng Phong. How the crown prince, Tao Yi, died remains unclear. The two Tai Lü versions differ slightly.

In the year CS 833, (1471 CE), Cao Moeng Luk (i.e., Tao Yi) was living in Moeng Phong. One day after drinking [rice wine] at Ban Khai [Man Gai], he rode on an elephant up the hill Dòi Nòi [i.e., Dòi Mòn Haeng Hap] where he committed suicide with his spear (Li Fuyi, 1947).

Tao Yi stayed in Moeng Phong. One day being drunk, he rushed recklessly on an elephant and knocked down a house of the people. He was killed with a spear (Gao Lishi, 1984).

Tao Yi was most probably murdered in Moeng Phong by an agent of the queen.

The people were dissatisfied with Tao Sam Pò Lütai. They claimed that the local unrest was caused by his son-in-law, Cao Moeng Khak, so the people rose against him. Tao Sam Pò Lütai hid his son-in-law in ho pha pong (he-pa-beng). The people concentrated on attacking him day and night with guns, crossbows, and firearms. As Cao Moeng Khak could no longer hide, he fled upstream on the Mekong River, via Moeng Wang, Moeng Khang, and Moeng Cae, and returned to Moeng Khün (Chiang Tung). The people of Moeng Khang escorted Nang Khò Moeng to Moeng Khün and gave her to Cao Moeng Khak. Cao Moeng Khak and his wife blamed his elder brother, Phaya Khün, for not sending troops to help them. He killed his brother Phaya Khün and fled to a temple, where he died as well.

Tao Sam Pò Lütai was succeeded by his third son, Sam Khai Noeng (r.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> According to the 1963-Tai Lü, 18.17, they fought at Kòng Hua Kum near Chiang Rung.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> He-pa-beng probably means "inner quarters of a palace."

These three *moeng* were located in the former Ningjiang Department and Nanqiao County, now Menghai County.

1497–1502/1491–1495), who was military commander and lord of Moeng U-Nüa (in present day Laos).

Moeng Lü Becomes a Vassal to Two Overlords: China and Ava Burma

The cumulative chronicles of the ancient rulers of Moeng Lü end with coverage of Tao Sam Pò Lütai. The records of the three rulers after Tao Sam Pò Lütai, from 1497 to 1530, are very brief, but this does not mean that the succession was smooth.<sup>76</sup> The second part of the chronicles of Moeng Lü begins with the reign of Cao Ong Moeng (Li: Cao Nò Moeng) and the subjugation of Chiang Rung by the Burmese king of Dagon. As one chronicle relates:

In the year CS 930, a poek si year (1568 CE), the King of Dagon (Yangôn)<sup>77</sup> [in] Burma appointed General Maha Tham to command an army to conquer Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung).<sup>78</sup> Only then did Cao Nò (Un/Ong) Moeng submit to His Majesty, the King of [Ava-] Burma. He commanded his aboriginal troops and followed the King of [Ava-] Burma, Fa Suttho Thammalaca —Mang Yinglong (Bayinnaung) — to conquer Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai.<sup>79</sup> During the victorious march back at Moeng Phayak<sup>80</sup> the Saenwi Fa Cao Nò (Un/Ong) Moeng fell ill and died (Li Fuyi, 1947).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> They were Sam Khai Noeng, Cao Khan Moeng, and Cao Sili Somphan.

Pegu, not Dagon, was the royal seat of the Toungoo Dynasty (1486–1752 or 1531–1752). However, when king Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760), who founded the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), conquered Lower Burma in the mid-1750s, he developed Dagon as a port and renamed it Yangôn (Rangoon), which means "The End of Strife."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> After Moeng Lü capitulated to Burma, Chiang Rung (city of dawn) was renamed Chiang Yung (city of peacock).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> According to CMC (1995), pp. 122–23, Chiang Mai was invaded by King Poeng Phawa Min Taya of Pegu during the period from 1557 to 1558.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Moeng Phayak is located to the southeast of Chiang Tung (or Kengtung) in Burma.

The expansion of Burmese power to the east is rather well documented in contemporary Chinese sources such as the *Mingshi Gao*, which relates:

In the year Jiajing 11 (1532), the Burmese bandit, Mang Ying-li 莽應 寒 (sic) (Nandabayin, r. 1581–1599), soccupied Baigu 擺 古 [Pegu] and annexed [the lands of] the various barbarians one after another, like silk worms nibbling mulberry leaves. [The chieftains of] most of the aboriginal commissions [tusi] [Tai polities], being threatened by Mang Ying-li, served as his guides. At that time, the Pacification Commissioner of Cheli, Dao Nuo-meng 刀 糯 猛 [Cao Nò Moeng, r. 1530–1568], also submitted to Burma. Hence, there were two Cheli, the Greater Cheli and Lesser Cheli. The Greater Cheli owed its allegiance to Burma, while the Lesser Cheli to the Han [China]. so

In Tianqi 7, 4th month, [on *geng-xu* day] (May 28, 1627), the Grand Coordinator (*xunfu*), Min Hong-xue 閔 洪 學, submitted a memorial [to the throne]. As the memorial is related in the *Mingshi Gao*,

The Burmese chieftain by the name of Zhao Ba-lang Wu-han 召 霸 浪 烏 罕 [Cao Pharang U-Kham?] is a descendant of Mang Ying-li 莽 應 裏 [Nandabayin, r. 1581–1599]. [They] are called Mang, or Man, or Mian, or Ava. In general, they belong to the Mang dala [mang ta ja: Burmese king] tribes. Their dens [caoxue] are called Baigu [Pegu], Wengsa, and Dongwu [Toungou]. Incidentally, they raised troops to attack the

<sup>81</sup> It could not have been Mang Yingli who conquered Pegu in 1532, but probably Mang Rui-ti (Tabinshwehti, r. 1531–1550) or Mang Ying-long

(Bayinnaung, r. 1551–1581).

Mingshi Gao 189, 32b. In Tianqi Dian zhi, ch. 30, p. 34 on Cheli, it states: "In the reign of Jiajing (1522–66), [Cheli] was subordinate to Burma. In the year Wanli 11 (1584), the government troops attacked Burma. The Pacification Commissioner (xuanwei), Dao Nuo-meng (Tao Nò Moeng), sent envoys to offer tribute in elephant(s) and local products. The elder brother stayed in the Greater Cheli and offered his allegiance to the Burmese envoys; the younger brother stayed in the Lesser Cheli and offered his allegiance to the Chinese envoys."

Prefecture of Menggen (Moeng Khün; Keng Tung). The Prefect sought help from Cheli (Sipsòng Panna). Pacification Commissioner [of Cheli], Dao Yun-meng 刀 韞 猛 (Cao Ong Moeng, r. 1598-1628), sent ten thousand soldiers, [and] ten elephants, and marched to reinforce them. [Thus, the Burmesel took revenge. [At that time] Dao Yun-meng, who was old and weak, was eager to seek a peaceful solution, [so he decided to pay a huge bribe [as indemnity] for the peace. When the Burmese chief heard that Dao Yun-meng's son, Zhao Hexuan 召 河 璇, had a beautiful daughter called Zhao Wu-gang 召 鳥 岡, he demanded [Sipsòng Panna] to deliver Zhao Wugang to him. However, Zhao He-xuan cheated the Burmese by giving him a different girl. When the Burmese realised that it was the wrong girl, he was greatly exasperated. He then sent his troops and moved the troops of Babai (Lan Na) and other places to attack Mengzhe (Moeng Cae) and Cheli (Chiang Rung). As Dao Yun-meng and his son could not resist the attack, they fled to Simao (Moeng La), a land under [Chiang Rung]. Forthwith, the Burmese sent two guides to pursue [the fugitives] in the night, captured Dao Yun-meng and Zhao Hexuan, and brought them back under escort. The conflicts between Ava and Cheli began in Wanli 44 (1616) ... [The frontier officials] petitioned to send a punitive force against Burma's crimes. However, before China could confer about sending troops, Cheli (Sipsòng Panna) was already destroyed.<sup>83</sup>

The expansion of Burmese power in the sixteenth century coincided with the weakening of Ming control over the Tai kingdoms on China's southern frontiers. Sipsòng Panna was completely under the control of Ava-Burma in the early seventeenth century. The twenty-second ruler of Moeng Lü, Cao In Moeng (r. 1568–1598/1569–1578), was offered a Burmese princess as his queen consort. The Burmese king interfered directly in the appointment of the *Saenwi Fa* of Sipsòng Panna. The *Saenwi Fa* of Sipsòng Panna, after being appointed by China, had to send envoys to Burma to ask for the consent of the Burmese king. The loyalty

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Mingshi Gao 189, 32b.

of the ruling house of Sipsòng Panna was split between China and Burma. Ambitious uncles or cousins offered their allegiance to Burma to strengthen their power. It happened that there were two Tai Lü *Saenwi Fa*, one recognised by China and the other by Burma. Moeng Lü paid tribute to both China and Burma, learning how to survive under the "protection" of two foreign overlords. The supreme rulers of Moeng Lü during this period who owed allegiance to the Burmese king were conferred Burmese titles. They had both Tai Lü names and sinicised names.

## The Sixth Fratricidal Conflict

The continued succession of *Saenwi Fa* to the throne seemed to run smoothly until China deposed the incompetent Tao Sao Wün (Dao Shao-wen, r. 1729–1767/1707–1730). According to two different chronicles:

In the year CS 1129, moeng-kai (1767 CE), the Heavenly Court accused Tao Sao Wün of being incompetent in managing the affairs and dismissed him (Li Fuyi, 1947).

Tao Sao Wün succeeded his elder brother [Tao Cin Pao] to the throne in the year CS 1069, *moeng-kai* (1707 CE) at the age of twenty-five years. <sup>85</sup> [...] Tao Sao Wün succeeded to the throne and was also appointed by the Heavenly Court and conferred by the King of Burma. Tao Sao Wün was unable to administrate. He was weak and incapable. The Burmese invaded the frontiers frequently, plundered many animals and properties, yet no resistance was posed. As a result the inhabitants of Sipsòng Panna fled in great numbers [to other

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> In 1818, Tao Thai Kang led the *cao moeng* from the east and west of the Mekong to Burma and he returned to Chiang Rung as the Burmese *Saenwi Fa*, while his nephew Tao Sunwu was the Chinese *Saenwi Fa*. See Li Fuyi (1947), p. 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> According to the Veritable Records of the Qing, Dao Shao-wen (Tao Sao Wün) succeeded his father, who died in Yongzheng 7 (1729), in Yongzheng 12, 8th month (1734), at the age of fifteen years. *Shizong Shilu* 146, p. 13.

places]. Hence he was deposed by the Heavenly Court (Gao Lishi, 1984).

The Burmese invasions around the mid-eighteenth century are well documented in the Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty (*Qing Shilu*). According to the Veritable Records of the Gaozong, the "stupid" and "cowardly" *Saenwi Fa* of Cheli (Sipsòng Panna), Dao Shao-wen, was deposed in early 1767 (Qianlong 31, 12<sup>th</sup> month, *bingwu* day: Jan. 10, 1767; CS 1128). Li Fuyi must have adjusted the year according to the Chinese sources.

The incompetent Tao Sao Wün (Dao Shao-wen) had six sons: Tao Wui Phin (Dao Wei-ping), Tao Cao Thian, Tao Cao Paeng, Tao Cao Suwan, Tao Cao Saeng, and Tao Cao Cai, and many grandchildren and great grandchildren. After Tao Sao Wün had been deposed, his eldest son, Tao Wui Phin (r. 1767-1777/1730-1745), succeeded him as *Saenwi Fa* and his second son, Tao Cao Thian, was appointed the Vice-*Saenwi Fa* by the Burmese court.<sup>87</sup>

In the year CS 1129 (1767 CE), the Heavenly Court (Qing court) appointed Tao Wui Phin (Dao Wei-ping) as the *Saenwi Fa*. Tao Wui Phin sent emissaries to deliver a letter to the King of Burma and report [the event]. The King of Burma consented and appointed Tao Wui Phin as the *Saenwi Fa* of the Burmese side (court). His younger brother Tao Cao Thian was appointed the Vice-*Saenwi Fa* (Upalaca)<sup>88</sup> of the Burmese side (court) (Li Fuyi, 1947).

In the following year, Tao Wui Phin and his younger brother, Tao Cao Thian, became aware of the dissent sown by the former's son-in-law, Cao Moeng Nai, and Cao Kòng of Moeng Yòng (Mengyong). They resented the Qing Court, so they defected with their families to Moeng

<sup>88</sup> Vice-king or Vice-*Saenwi Fa*, i.e., Upalaca.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> See *Gaozong Shilu* 774, pp. 10–11.

According to Gao Lishi (1984), p. 122, "Tao Wui Phin succeeded to the throne and his younger brother Tao Cao Thian was appointed Upalaca (Vice-Seanwi Fa)." The same is recorded in 1963-Tai Lü. This could mean that Tao Wui Phin appointed his younger brother, Tao Cao Thian, as his vice-king.

Yòng. Later, they returned to Chiang Rung, but the Qing Court distrusted them. In the year CS 1135 (1773 CE), the Qing court dispatched officials to Chiang Rung and arrested Tao Wui Phin and his younger brother, Tao Mòm Suwan. They were brought to Moeng Maen (Ninger) and then escorted to Moeng Sae Luang (Kunming). Tao Wui Phin and Tao Cao Thian were removed from their posts. The Qing Court prohibited Tao Wui Phin's son -- Cao Fa Can (i.e., Tao Yung Khò) -- and Tao Cao Thian's sons -- Cao Maha Phom and Cao Mahakhanan -- to succeed them to the post of *Saenwi Fa*.<sup>89</sup>

Tao Wui Phin lived in Moeng Sae (Kunming) three years until he died of illness. Tao Cao Suwan (r. 1777-1796/1746-1763), the younger brother of Tao Cao Thian, was then sent back to Sipsòng Panna to succeed to the throne. Tao Cao Suwan had three sons: Tao Thai Phin (died young), Tao Thai Khò (Cao Mòm Mahawong), and Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang). Tao Cao Sunwan died in 1796 CE (or, perhaps, 1763).

In the year CS 1159 (1797 CE), the Qing Court appointed the second son of Tao Cao Suwan, Tao Thai Khò (r. 1797-1802/1764-1770), as the Saenwi Fa of Cheli. Tao Thai Khó dispatched envoys to Burma to ask the King of Burma to confer on him the Burmese Saenwi Fa-ship of Sipsong Panna. However, the Burmese authorities disapproved on the grounds that Tao Thai Khò was too young. Instead, the King of Burma immediately summoned his elder uncle, Tao Cao Thian (Dao Zhaoding), to Burma to agree to be the vassal (subject and servant) of both China and Burma. Tao Cao Thian dispatched his envoys Phaya Luang Khoen from Moeng Cae and Phaya U-ten from Chiang Rung to Burma to make the request on his behalf. The King of Burma consented and appointed Tao Cao Thian as the Saenwi Fa on the Burmese side. Thus, the Qing Court had appointed Tao Thai Khò and the Burmese Court had appointed his uncle, Tao Cao Thian, to be the Saenwi Fa for the Manchu and Burmese Courts. The Burmese authorities still refused to recognise Tao Tai Khò, so the seeds of the dispute over the succession were sown. This later led to fighting for the throne between the faction led by Cao Maha Khanan and his son Cao Nò Kham and that led by the two grandsons of Tao Mòm Suwan, Cao Suca Wanna (or Tao Coen Cong) and Cao Lammawuttha (or Tao Soen Cong) (see below).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Li Fuyi (1947), p. 31.

Three years later (1800 CE), Tao Thai Khò (i.e., Cao Mòm Mahawong) dispatched Phaya Luang Khiao Kham Pian from Chiang Rung and Laca Cai from Moeng Cae to Burma to present another memorial to the king, requesting permission to succeed to the throne of *Saenwi Fa*. The King of Burma consented and appointed Tao Thai Khò as the Burmese *Saenwi Fa*. The Burmese emissary brought the letter of appointment to Chiang Tung (Kengtung). However, Tao Thai Khò had died from illness and there was no one to whom the letter of appointment could be delivered. This occured in the year CS 1164 (1802 CE).

Cao Fa Can (Tao Yung Khò) becomes a Burmese Saenwi Fa; Cao Maha Phom killed by Cao Fa Can; the Splitting allegiance of the People in Sipsòng Panna

Tao Thai Khò (i.e., Cao Mòm Mahawong) had a son called Tao Sunwu (Dao Sheng-wu), whose Tai name was Cao Maha Nòi. He was just two years old, too young to be appointed as the *Saenwi Fa*. Thus, the Sipsòng Panna nobles held a meeting and decided to go to Moeng Luang (Menglong) to invite Tao Sunwu's uncle, Tao Yung Khò (whose Tai name is Cao Fa Can),<sup>90</sup> to be ruler, but the Qing Court disapproved. Nevertheless, Tao Yung Khò still dispatched Cao Tham of Moeng Hai (Menghai) and Cao Laca Cai of Moeng Luang (Menglong) to Ava to request permission for the succession. They followed the envoys sent by Burma to Ava. The King of Burma therefore appointed Tao Yung Khò as the Burmese appointee to the position of *Saenwi Fa*.

Tao Yung Khò (viz. Cao Can or Cao Fa Can) was not on friendly terms with his cousin, Cao Maha Phom (son of Tao Cao Thian), so Tao Yung Khò sent his guards to kill Cao Maha Phom at Chiang Lò (Jingluo). As the six *panna* located to the east of the Mekong River had always supported Cao Maha Phom, they refused to submit. Under the leadership of the Cao Fa of Moeng Phong (Mengpeng), they commanded troops to attack Tao Yung Khò. The six *panna* to the west of the river could not triumph over the six *panna* in the east, so Tao Yung Khò fled with his wives and children to Chiang Tung (Moeng Khün).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> He was the son of Tao Wui Phin and was not permitted to be the *Saenwi Fa* of the Qing court.

After Cao Fa Can had succeeded to the throne, he dispatched Cao Tham from Moeng Hai and Cao Laca Cai from Moeng Luang to accompany the Burmese emissaries back to Moeng Nai and Angwa [Ava]. The King of Burma approved and appointed Cao Fa Can as *Saenwi Fa*. Later, Cao Fa Can and Cao Maha Phom [the two cousins] were not in friendly terms. Cao Fa Can sent "khun-khaek" [kaeo-han?? (i.e., praetorian guards)] and had Cao Maha Phom killed. The six *panna* to the east of the [Mekong] River favoured Cao Maha Phom. Under the leadership of the Cao Fa of Moeng Phong, they commanded troops and marched to attack Cao Fa Can. The six *panna* to the west of the [Mekong] River favoured Cao Fa Can, but could not triumph over the six *panna* to the east of the river (Gao Lishi, 1984).<sup>91</sup>

Not long afterwards, Tao Yung Khò (Cao Fa Can) travelled to Ava to ask the King of Burma to send troops to help him return to Sipsòng Panna. He was willing to present the six *panna* to the west of the Mekong River to Burma, while the six *panna* east of the river, would remain under the suzerainty of the Qing Court. The Mekong River was to be the boundary. The King of Burma turned down the offer because there was no such precedent. Tao Yung Khò's motive was to instigate a war. The Burmese king threw Tao Yung Khò into prison, then, a year later, banished him to Moeng Nai.

In the year CS 1165 (1803 CE), King Kawila (r. 1782–1816) of Chiang Mai conquered and annexed Moeng Pae (Phrae) and Moeng Nan (in Siam). He then marched north with his troops to Moeng Ta Lò (Daluo 打 洛). <sup>92</sup> At that time, all the *cao fa* and *cao mòm* to the east of the Salween (Nam Hung) River had submitted to Kawila except for Tao Yung Khò (Cao Can or Cao Fa Can).

In the year CS 1168 (1806 CE), the Supreme Commander of Moeng Nai, Ngon Moang Moeng, ordered Tao Yung Khò (Cao Fa Can) to join

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> The same is recorded in Li Fuyi (1947), 30.6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Daluo (or Moeng Ta Lò) in Fohai County is a border town on the eastern bank of the Nanlan River (Nam Lam), only five kilometres from Burma.

forces with the Burmese commander-in-chief, Sayachuo Na-nao (Sa-ya-zuo Na-nuo), to attack Kawila. However, Tao Yung Khò had other plans. He hoped to make use of the Kawila troops to reoccupy Sipsòng Panna so that he could become the *Saenwi Fa* again. Thus, he secretly offered silks and money to Kawila at Moeng Ta Lò (Daluo) and persuaded Kawila to move his camp to the Brasat Nòng Wat at Chiang Coeng in Moeng Hai. Tao Yung Khò submitted to Kawila's authorities and secretly brought his wives and children to Kawila's camp. Later, he followed Kawila and defected to Chiang Mai where he passed away without an heir.

In the years from CS 1168–1170 (1806–1808 CE), the Burmese commander-in-chief, Sayachuo Na-nao, fought a violent and bloody war with Kawila of Siam. Many places, including Chiang Tung, Chiang Rung (Sipsòng Panna), Moeng Laem, Chiang Khaeng, and Moeng Yòng were ruined and the villages were left desolate. The nobles and people from those places fled in great confusion to Moeng Küng Ma (Gengma), Moeng Kla (Mengjia), Moeng Bò (Mengbo), Moeng Tuo (Mengduo), Moeng Pan (Mengban), Moeng Kaeo (Jiaozhi), and Laos (Laowo), as well as to Moeng Hò (Chinese region). Those who could not flee in time were captured by Kawila and deported to Chiang Mai and Moeng Nan. Consequently, the region around Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung) was depopulated and became desolate. This is documented in Tai Lü sources:

Because of the invasion of Kawila and of the defection of Cao Fa Can (i.e., Tao Yung Khò), Chiang Tung, Chiang Rung, Moeng Laem, Chiang Khaeng, and Moeng Yòng became battle fields. Countless animals, properties and inhabitants of Sipsòng Panna had been looted or captured by Kawila and deported to Moeng Phrae, Moeng Nan, and Chiang Mai. Those who were not captured fled in hast to Küng Ma (Gengma), Moeng Kla, Moeng Bò, and Moeng Pan (in present day Jinggu County). Some of them fled to Moeng Kaeo (Vietnam), Moeng Lao (Laos), and Moeng Hò (Chinese territory). As a result many stockade-villages in Sipsòng Panna were depopulated and lands were deserted and fields turned desolate (Gao Lishi, 1984). 93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> A very similar account is recorded in Li Fuyi (1947), 31.4, which agrees that

The Rivalry Between Tao Sunwu (nephew) and Tao Thai Khang (uncle)

As described above, in the year CS 1164 (1802 CE), Tao Sunwu (Cao Mòm Maha Nòi) succeeded his father, Tao Thai Khò (Cao Mahawong), as the *Saenwi Fa* at the age of just two years old. The Qing Court appointed another uncle, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang), as regent.

When he was of age in the year CS 1179 (1817 CE), the Qing Court formally appointed Tao Sunwu (Cao Mòm Maha Nòi) as *Saenwi Fa*. At that time, the Crown Prince of Burma, Maha Nem Nyo, was the Supreme Commander of Moeng Nai. He sent envoys to Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung) to summon Tao Sunwu (Cao Mòm Maha Nòi) and Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang) to Burma (Ava). They could not leave Chiang Rung because they were the *Saenwi Fa* and regent of the Qing court so the King of Burma was displeased.

The following year, CS 1180 (1818 CE), the various cao moeng from the east and west of the Mekong River, under the leadership of Tao Sunwu's uncle, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang), travelled with the Burmese emissaries to Ava to pay their respects to the King of Burma, Bodawhpaya, (r. 1781–1819). Bodawhpaya was delighted and immediately appointed Tao Thai Khang as the Burmese Saenwi Fa with the title, Coti Nakkala (Nagara) Mahawongsa Laca. Then Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang) returned to Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung) to assume the post of the Burmese Saenwi Fa. Thus, at that time there were two Saenwi Fa in Chiang Rung: The Qing Court recognised Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi), while the Burmese Court recognised the regent, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang).

The uncle and nephew ruled together for a year, but they were not on friendly terms. Tao Thai Khang was more powerful than his nephew, Tao Sunwu. Tao Sunwu, aware that he was no match for his uncle, sought refuge in Moeng La (Simao). The officials and people from the area east of the Mekong River all followed him. Later, Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi), dissatisfied with the Chinese officials, secretly sent Cao Khanan from Moeng Òng (Mengwang)<sup>95</sup> to Moeng Pae (Phrae) and Moeng

the battles were fought between the years CS 1168 and 1170 (1806 and 1808 CE).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> A son of Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) of Shwebo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> According to 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle, 38.4, Cao Khanan was the ruler of

Nan to bribe and persuade Kawila to attack his uncle, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang). In the year CS 1184 (1822 CE), Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang) and Kawila fought at Moeng Ham (Gan-lan-ba). The defeated Kawila took his troops to plunder Moeng Yò (Mengyue) and Moeng Bun (Mengben). As one chronicle relates,

The uncle and nephew ruled together one year. Later because of a power struggle they were not in friendly terms. Cao Maha Nòi (Tao Sunwu), aware that he was isolated and weak, sought refuge in Moeng La (Simao and Liushun) on the pretext of learning. The five moeng to the east of the river all supported Cao Maha Nòi. Later, Cao Maha Nòi was dissatisfied with the senior official of Simao (Moeng La) and wanted to return to Chiang Yung (Rung). But as he was of no match for Cao Mahawang, he secretly sent Cao Khanan of Moeng Òng to bring money to Moeng Phrae and Moeng Nan to persuade Kawila to come to attack Cao Mahawang. They fought at Moeng Ham (i.e., Ganlanba).97 As the [military] strength of Kawila could not match that of Cao Mahawang, he turned instead to plunder Moeng Yò and Moeng Bun, and robbed every thing before returning (Gao Lishi, 1984).

The Burmese appointed the commander-in-chief, Suai Ling Tewa (Rui Lin Diewa), to pick one hundred and fifty brave men and march straight to Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung) to arrest Tao Sunwu. Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) abandoned his wives and children in Moeng La (Simao) and fled to the hills in Bò La (Yibang). The Burmese commander-in-chief, Suai Ling Tewa, took a small path to the hills and arrested Tao Sunwu, and delivered him under escort to Ava. The Burmese found Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) guilty and incarcerated him in the royal prison. Later, on the petition of his uncle, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang), the

Moeng Bang.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Previously Moeng Yò and Moeng Bun were in Moeng La (Zhenyue) under Sipsòng Panna, now in Laos.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> According to Li Fuyi (1947), 31.9, the battle was fought in Moeng Ham (south of Chiang Rung) in the year CS 1184 (1822 CE).

King of Burma allowed Tao Sunwu to serve as his personal attendant.

Tao Sunwu was the *Saenwi Fa* of China, but the Burmese detained him. In year CS 1187 (1825 CE), the Qing court sent envoys to Ava and demanded that Burma deliver Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) to them. Tao Sunwu was first brought back to Kunming and then placed under detention in Simao (Moeng La), where he lived for six years.

In the year CS 1195 (1833 CE), Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) bribed the hill tribes and the lords (cao mòm) of the moeng (polity) in the eastern half of Sipsòng Panna. He won their support for a joint attack on Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang). Tao Thai Khang marched his troops to the foothills of Dòi Nam Yang (Nanyang), where he defeated the tribal forces raised by Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi). He then proceeded to Simao (Moeng La), where Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) was detained. The Chinese officials ordered Tao Sunwu to disband his tribal militia, but he defied the order. Thus, the Chinese officials in Simao petitioned to the Governor-general of Yunnan-Guizhou (seat in Kunming) to dismiss Tao Sunwu from office and to send his wife (wives) and son(s) under escort to Kunming. This was approved, but Tao Sunwu managed to take his seal and absconded secretly to Moeng Sò on the border of Vietnam, where he later died.

# Tao Coen Cong Against his Uncles and Cousins

Tao Thai Khang had two sons: the eldest was Tao Coen Cong (Dao Zheng-zong), whose Tai name was Cao Suca Wanna and the younger was Tao Soen Cong (Dao Cheng-zong), whose Tai name was Cao Sali Wanna or Cao Lamma Awuttha. In 1834 CE, after defeating his nephew, Tao Sunwu, Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang) petitioned the Qing Court in Beijing to allow his son Tao Coen Cong to succeed him as *Saenwi Fa*. It was approved. Two years later (1836 CE), Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Mahawang) died.

In 1837 CE, the newly installed *Saenwi Fa*, Tao Coen Cong (Cao Suca Wanna), and his younger brother, Tao Soen Cong, sent envoys to

100 They were Phaya Luang Sai, the lord of Moeng Cae (Mengzhe), the lord of

<sup>98</sup> The Lua (Lawa), Musoe (Luohei), and San Thaen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Moeng La-Tai (Liushun), Moeng Hing (Puteng), Moeng Ong (Mengwang), Chiang Tòng (Zhengdong), and Moeng U-Nüa (Mengwu).

deliver a memorial to the King of Burma. The King of Burma consented and appointed Tao Coen Cong as the *Saenwi Fa* of the Burmese side with the honorific title, *Coti Nakkala (Nagara) Maha Wongsa Laca*. His younger brother, Tao Soen Cong (also called Cao Sali Wanna), was appointed as the Vice-*Saenwi Fa* (i.e., *Upalaca*).

The next civil war involving foreign intervention took place in the reigns of Tao Coen Cong (Dao Zheng-zong, r. 1834–1864/1809–1827) and Tao Soen Cong (Dao Cheng-zong). Two years after Tao Coen Cung was enthroned, his uncles and cousins banded together against the two brothers to claim the throne of the *Saenwi Fa*.

In 1838 CE, Cao Maha Khanan,<sup>101</sup> Tao Cao Cai,<sup>102</sup> Cao Nò Kham,<sup>103</sup> and Cao Phom,<sup>104</sup> colluded with Phaya Luang Cang, Phaya Luang Cana Lücai, and Phaya Còm Kham. They led three hundred soldiers to Chiang Rung to fight the two brothers for the throne of the *Saenwi Fa*. They besieged the fortifications of the *Saenwi Fa* and declared that they were going to kill both Tao Coen Cong and Tao Soen Cong and annihilate the headmen (nobles) of their immediate family and their close relations (Li Fuyi, 1947).<sup>105</sup>

Moeng Hing (Puteng), Phaya Phom of Chiang Thòng (Zhengdong), and Phaya Pala of Moeng Phong (Mengpeng). See Li Fuyi (1947), p. 37; Gao Lishi (1984), p. 124.

<sup>101</sup> He was Tao Cao Thian's second son. Thus, he was the cousin of Tao Coen Cong's father.

Tao Cao Cai was Tao Sao Wün's sixth son. Thus, Tao Cao Cai was Cao Maha Khanan's uncle and the young Tao Coeng Cong's grand uncle.

According to Li Fuyi (1947), p. 31 (27.2), Cao Nò Kham was the eldest son of Cao Maha Khanan, who was the second son of Tao Cao Thian. Thus Cao Nò Kham and Cao Coen Cong were cousins. But according to Gao Lishi (1984), p. 122 (35. Tao Suwan), Cao Phom, Cao Cai and Cao Nò Kham were the three sons of Tao Cao Cai (Tao Sao Wün's sixth son). Hence Cao Nò Kham was the uncle of Cao Coen Cong.

According to Li Fuyi (1947), he was a younger brother of Cao Nò Kham.

Cheng-zong) were the sons of Cao Mòm Mahawang (Tao Thai Khang) and grandsons of Tao Mòm Suwan (Dao Shiwan), who was a younger brother of Tao Cao Thian (Dao Zhaoding). Tao Thai Khang and Cao Maha Khanan were cousins. Cao Nò Kham, supported by his father, was fighting for the throne with his cousins Cao Suca Wanna and Cao Lamma Awuttha.

Cao Chiang Ha (the speaker of the nüa sanam)<sup>106</sup> and the other nobles of the moeng in Sipsong Panna<sup>107</sup> were against Cao Maha Khanan's plot. They thus made a counter-plot. They pretended to surrender, but in the middle of the night they sent a military officer of Moeng Phong (Mengpeng) to bring Tao Coen Cong (Cao Suca Wanna) and his younger brother across the Mekong River. They were first hidden at Ban Na Kha (Man Naka) and later escorted to Simao (Moeng La) under the protection of the Chinese. After the two brothers had gone, Cao Chiang Ha summoned the nobles of Sipsong Panna for a meeting. They decided to appoint Cao Nò Kham as Saenwi Fa, and proposed promoting Phaya Luang Cang, Phaya Luang Cana Lücai, and Phaya Còm Kham to be the ministers of the Council of Nobles (nüa sanam). 108 As the three men were going to the Council of Nobles (nüa sanam) to assume their posts, soldiers hidden in an ambush set up by the various nobles of Sipsòng Panna suddenly rose and caught the three men, and immediately had them killed before the Council of Nobles. Frightened, Cao Nò Kham fled. 109

Cao Nò Kham hid in the upland forests. When he saw that his father (Cao Maha Khanan), his brother (Cao Phom), and clan members had all been killed, he fled from Sipsòng Panna to Moeng Pan and then to Moeng Küng Ma (Gengma), where he sought refuge. Not long afterwards, he returned to Chiang Rung and mustered the Pha Phüng (hill tribes in Fohai) and Musoe (Luohei) to harass Sipsòng Panna. Defeated, the tribal troops dispersed and later he hid again at Pha Phüng. 110

The lord of Chiang Tung sent his son Tao Bun Hoeng (Roeng) (Tao

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Nüa sanam, the council of nobles of the Tai Lü people was like the Parliament of the Cao phaendin of Moeng Lü. It was an administrative council, where the nobles (khun) convened to discuss state affairs. The President of the speaker of the Council was called Cao Chiang Ha.

According to 1963-Tai Lü, 39.3, they were the khun hua-moeng (provincial nobles).

According to 1963-Tai Lü, 39.4, the three *phaya* were to be promoted to *amat* ton phu nyai (i.e., high-ranking officials) [of the nüa sanam].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Li Fuyi (1947), p. 37; the same is recorded in Gao Lishi (1984), p. 125.

According to 1963-Tai Lü, 39.6, and Gao Lishi (1984), p. 125, Cao Nò Kham mustered Lua and Kha Kui Pha Phüng and returned to harass Sipsòng Panna. Defeated, he fled to the hills of Kha Kui Pha Phüng.

Ben-leng) to lead fifty men to Ban Kha Wa of Ban Chiang Can to pick up Cao Nò Kham and force him to leave the Kha Kui, the Lua, and Musoe. During this time, the tribal troops under Cao Chiang Ha were engaged in a bitter and bloody war with the Pha Phüng and Musoe. Tao Bun Hoeng (Roeng) captured Cao Nò Kham and brought him to Chiang Tung. On the way, passing Moeng Man and Moeng Cae, they burnt and looted more than ten villages, including Ban Kao, Hua Moeng, and Ban Kha. They arrived at Chaing Tung (Kengtung) and sought refuge from the Phaya of Chiang Tung.

In the same year (AD 1838), the Phaya of Chiang Tung incited Cao Phom<sup>111</sup> and Cao Nò Kham to launch another attack on Sipsòng Panna and Moeng Laem from the rear. At that time, Sipsòng Panna was still fighting a war against the Mosoe.<sup>112</sup> On learning that Cao Nò Kham was leading his troops to attack them, they dispatched a contingent of soldiers to fight against Cao Nò Kham at Ban Na Ngòi in Moeng Pan.<sup>113</sup> Cao Nò Kham's troops were defeated. The troops of Sipsòng Panna pursued them to Moeng La and Moeng Ma. The fighting went on for a long period and could not be stopped.

The news reached the Qing and Burmese courts. They regarded Cao Nò Kham as the ringleader of the conflicts. The Chinese officials of Simao (Moeng La) sent the district magistrate, Wei, and the district magistrate, Shen, to Chiang Rung to end the hostilities. The Burmese also sent their high official, *pyanki*<sup>114</sup> Nòratha, and the *sitkè* of Chiang Tung<sup>115</sup> to Chiang Rung to mediate in the disputes. The delegates of the Qing and Burmese courts convened at Chiang Rung.

The chief delegate of Chiang Yung was the commander-in-chief of Sipsòng Panna, Cao Puttha Phommawongsa Mangkala Singhalaca of Moeng Chiang Ha.<sup>116</sup> The chief delegate of Moeng Laem was the commander-in-chief of Moeng Laem, Cao Puttha Phommawongsa

<sup>114</sup> Pyanki is an official title, comparable to "supreme commander."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> According to Gao Lishi (1984), p. 125, he was Cao Maha Phom.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> According to Gao Lishi (1984), this was Kagui (Kha Kui).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> To the west of Fohai County.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> *Sitkè* is an official title, comparable to "military officer" or "platoon leader." According to the 1963-Tai Lü, 39.9, and Gao Lishi (1984), p. 125, they were *pyanki* Nòratha (Winòthao) and the *sitkè* of Chiang Tung.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> This is the full title of Cao Chiang Ha, the president of the Council of Nobles (nia sanam).

Cotikalatha Wòlalaca. The chief delegate of Chiang Tung was the commander-in-chief of Moeng Khün, Phaya Luang Khaek Compu. An agreement was reached and five copies of the peace treaty were prepared: one each for the delegate of the Qing Court, the delegate of the Burmese side, Chiang Rung, Chiang Tung, and Moeng Laem.

The Chinese delegates agreed to give Cao Nò Kham to Chiang Tung, but Chaing Tung had to guarantee that he would not harass Sipsòng Panna. Chiang Tung agreed, but added a request:

If, in the future, the incumbent *Saenwi Fa* (Tao Ceon Cong, i.e., Cao Suca Wanna) should pass away without an heir, the five copies [of treaty] that have been made are to be gathered together and Cao Nò Kham shall be allowed to return to Chiang Yung (Chiang Rung) and succeed to the post (sic) throne of *Saenwi Fa* (Li Fuyi, 1947).<sup>117</sup>

The treaty was agreed on the second day of the waxing moon of the seventh month of the year CS 1201 (1839 CE). However, peace was not restored after the treaty, as Kawila came to attack Chiang Rung. Then, after the unrest caused by Kawila had been quelled, the Burmese envoys colluded with Phaya Chiang Tung, who wanted to seize the opportunity to reinstate Cao Nò Kham as ruler of Sipsòng Panna, by making false charges against Cao Suca Wanna (Tao Coen Cong/Dao Zhengzong). 118

### The Seventh Fratricidal Conflict

The Vice Saenwi Fa (upalaca) Cao Lamma Awuttha (Dao Cheng-zong), who married in Moeng Luang, had a son called Cao Mòm Sò (Dao Junan). The Saenwi Fa, Cao Suca Wanna (Dao Zheng-zong), adopted his nephew, Cao Mòm Sò. Later, Cao Suca Wanna had a son called Cao Mòm Saeng. On the death of Cao Suca Wanna, his son, Cao Mòm Saeng, was only two years old. Thus, Cao Mòm Sò (r. 1863–1869), who was twenty, became the Saenwi Fa. Fratricide took place sixteen years

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> The same is recorded in Gao Lishi (1984), p. 125, and in 1963-Tai Lü Chronicle (39.13).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Li Fuyi (1947), p. 39.

later when Cao Mòm Saeng was eighteen years old. He led troops to claim his father's throne and killed his cousin Cao Mòm Sò (i.e., Cao Mòm Khung Kham or Dao Jun-an). As one chronicle relates:

Cao Mòm Sò (Cao Mòm Khung Kham), Chinese name Tao Cin An (Pinyin: Dao Jun-an), succeeded his adopted father (i.e., uncle) to the throne in the year CS 1225, ka-kai (AD 1863) at the age of 20 years. He was on the throne 16 years, lived to the age of 36 years and died in the year CS 1241 (AD 1879). Later his younger brother Cao Mòm Saeng usurped the throne. He led warriors to chase Cao Mòm Sò out of the palace. Cao Mòm Sò fled to the monastery Wat Hua Nòng in Moeng Ham. Cao Mòm Saeng sent warriors to pursue him and had his elder brother (in fact cousin) killed at Wat Hua Nòng. This was a fratricidal war and power struggle (Gao Lishi, 1984).

Cao Mòm Saeng was on the throne for only three years. Under the leadership of Moeng La, the lords of the *moeng* to the east of the Mekong River rose against him. They killed him to the north of Ban Sa in Chiang Rung in the year CS 1245 (1883 CE). Cao Mòm Saeng died at the age of twenty-one and left no son. Thus, after the death of Cao Mòm Saeng, the eldest son of Cao Mòm Sò, who was brought to Chiang Tung after his father was killed, returned to become the *Saenwi Fa*.

### Conclusion

The Chronicles of Moeng Lü (CML) is replete with killings and civil wars. Recorded above are seven major conflicts involving disputes related to succession to the throne of *Saenwi Fa*. The CML's coverage of the successive reigns is not equal. The records of about one third of the reigns are very brief but that does not mean that there was no fighting during these reigns. Moeng Lü or Cheli was not a unified Tai kingdom. As recorded in the "Basic Annals" of the *History of the Yuan Dynasty* (*Yuanshi*), as early as around 1297/98 there were the Greater Cheli and Lessser Cheli. Moeng Lü was partitioned into two by the Mekong River long before Burmese expansion in the sixteenth century. The inter-Tai

conflicts are reflected in the contemporary Chinese sources.

As can be deduced from the very unequal length of the records and the discrepancies between the various versions, the various manuscript-copies of the Chronicles of Moeng Lü are not based on a master manuscript or a printed contemporary record. No CML had ever been published until 1947 when Li Fuyi translated several manuscript copies of Moeng Lü into Chinese and printed a short version of the Tai Lü manuscript copy besides his Chinese translations. The historical events of each reign were recorded posthumously. The various versions of the CML are cumulative works compiled over many years and have been copied and recopied with information added or deleted at various times.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> F. M. Liew and Volker Grabowsky are preparing the publication of their translations of two long versions and three short versions of the Chronicles of Moeng Lü.

# **Appendix**

# Table The Supreme Rulers (Cao Phaendin) of Moeng Lü (Sipsòng Panna)<sup>120</sup>

	Tai Lü	In Chinese <i>Pinyin</i>	Li Fuyi (1947)	Gao Lishi (1984)	Name of the princes, according to seniority
1	Phaya Coeng	Ba Zhen	1180–1192	1159–1180	4 sons: Tao Pung Hoeng (Lao Yoe Hoeng), Lord of Lan Na; Tao Ai Paeng, Lord of Moeng Keao; Tao Yi Kham Hoeng, Lord of Moeng Lao; Tao Sam Khai Noeng, heir to his father.
2	Sam Khai Noeng	Tao Kangleng	1192–1211	1180–1201	2 sons: Tao Pung (Kung); Ai Yi Peng (Piang), Lord of three panna (Moeng Hun, Moeng Hai and Moeng Cae).
3	Tao Pung/Ai Pung	Tao Beng	1211–1234	1201–1206	1 son: Tao Hung (Rung) Kaen Cai
4	Tao Hung (Rung) Kaen Cai	Tao Long Jian Zai	1234–1257	1206–1227	1 son: Tao Haeng Luang (Raeng); 1 daughter: Nang Kham Kai (mother of Mangkaka Nalai (or Tao Mangrai)
5	Tao Haeng Luang	Dao Lianglong	1257–1273	1228–1254	2 sons: Ai Puwak (Tao Puwak); Yi Peng (Piang) Lak Sai (Lord of Moeng Pòng/Fòng)
6	Tao Puwak	Dao Buwa	1273–1287	1255–1269	Without an heir

The years are converted into CE. The transliterations of Tai Lü names into Chinese, from Phaya Coeng to Cao Mòm Suca Wanna (Tao Coen Cong), are similar to those given in Li Fuyi (1947). As for the rulers after Cao Mòm Suca Wanna, the transliterations follow those given in Gao Lishi (1984).

7	Cao Yi Peng Lak Sai	Yi Bing La Sai	-	1270–1271	2 sons: Cao Ai; Prince of Moeng Pòng (name unknown)
8	Cao Ai	Dao Ai	1287–1347	1271–1311	1 son: Cao Khan Moeng
9	Cao Khan Moeng <sup>121</sup>	Dao Kan	1347–1391	1312–1350	3 sons: Tao Sida Kham; Tao Kumman (Lord of Na Mün Luang); Peo Fai Fa (Lord of Na Saen in Chiang Lan) <sup>122</sup>
10	Tao (Cao) Sida Kham <sup>123</sup>	Dao Xianda	1391–1413	1350–1430 (80 years)	3 sons: Tao Kü Moeng; Tao Kham Daeng or Tao Kham Tet (Tiat), Lord of Na Mün Paen; Tao Saen Nang, Lord of Moeng Hing <sup>124</sup>
11	Tao Kumman	Dao Gongman	_	1430–1432	1 son: Lord of Na Mün Luang (name is not given).
12	Tao Kü Moeng <sup>125</sup>	Dao Gengmeng	1413–1415	1433–1436	3 sons: Tao Bakòng, Lord of Moeng Phong; Tao Sòng Moeng; Tao Sam Pò Lütai
13	Tao Sòng Moeng	Dao Shuangmeng	2 ½ months	Between 1436–1439	140 0411 1 0 1441
14	Tao Bakòng	Dao Bagong	_	1439–1441	
15	Tao Kham Tet (Tiat) or Tao Kham Daeng	Dao Dian or Dao Khangliang	1417–1428	1442–1445	1 good-for- nothing son, so his name is unknown

121 He married Hòi Sam Cik, a Lawa (Lua) girl.

125 He married Nang Aen Kòm, the daughter of Tao Hin Ban.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> He married Nang Paeng Kham Daeng, the daughter of Cao Moeng Laem. They had three sons, Daet Ham Ya (Lord of Na Saen); Ngei Ka (died young); Süa Luang Fa (Süa Luang Fa).

<sup>123</sup> He married Nang Pòng Samoe, the sister of Phaya Moeng Khün, Ai Òn (or Òn Ai).

He had two sons: Cao Ai and Cao Yi, who later both became Lord of Moeng Hing.

16	Soe Long Fa (Süa Luang Fa) <sup>126</sup>	She Longfa	1428–1457	1446–1466	9 sons: 1) Tao Phasaeng; 2) Tao Còm Pha, Lord of Moeng Luang; 3) Tao Saeo, Lord of Na Mün Luang; 4) Tao Yòt, Lord of Moeng Long Nam Tha; 5) Tao Kham, Lord of Moeng U-Nüa; 6) Tao Ut, Lord of Moeng Hun; 7) Tao Som (Tao Cet), Lord of Moeng Ngat and Moeng Khang; 8) Tao Fa Nòi, Lord of Na Moeng Long; 9) Tao Sòt Sòi, Lord of Chiang Lu
17	Tao Phasaeng;	Dao Baxian	2 months in 1457	5 months in 1466	Chang Lu
18	Tao Sam Pò Lütai	San Bao Lidai	1457–1497	1467–1490	6 sons: 1) Tao Yi; 2) Cao Moeng, Lord of Moeng Khak; 3) Sam Khai Noeng, Lord of Moeng U-Nüa; 4) Cao Am, Lord of Noeng Nun; 5) Cao Ai; 6) Cao Khan Moeng
19	Tao Sam Khai Noeng	San Kaileng	1497–1502	1491–1495	Died without an heir.
20	Cao Khan Moeng	Zhao Kan	1502–1523	1496–1518	1 son: Cao Sili (Sali) Somphan
21	Cao Sili (Sali) Somphan	Zhao Sili Songban	1523–1530	1518–1539	1 son: Cao Un (Ong) Moeng
22	Cao Un (Ong) Moeng	Dao Nuomeng	1530–1568	1539–1567	2 sons: Cao Sali Sunanta; Cao In Moeng

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> He was adopted by his uncle, Tao Sida Kham, and was first invested as the Lord of Moeng Phong. He married his cousin Nang Lun Koei, the sister of Tao Kü Moeng. Later, he also married his cousin's wife, Nang Aen Kòm (the mother of Tao Kü Moeng's three sons).

23	Cao Sali Sunanta	Zhao Sili Sunanda	6 months in 1568	6 months in 1568	Died without an heir.
24	Cao In Moeng <sup>127</sup>	Dao Yingmeng	1569–1598	1569–1578	1 son: Cao Ong (Nò) Moeng
25	Cao Ong (Nò) Moeng	Dao Yunmeng	1598–1628	1584–1602	1 son: Cao Sili (Sali) Suthamma
26	Cao Sili (Sali) Suthamma	Zhao Shili Sutanma	1628–1639	1603–1620	2 sons: Cao Móm Kham Lü; Cao Mòm Tao
27	Cao Mòm Kham Lü	Zhao Kangle	1639–1669	1621–1634	2 sons: Cao Saeng Moeng (died early); Cao Nò Moeng (still young)
28	Cao Mòm Tao	Dao Mudao	-	1634–1641	1 son: Tao Moeng Tao
29	Cao Nò Moeng	Dao Nuomeng	1669–1681	1642–1655	Died without an heir.
30	Cao Moeng Tao	Dao Mengtao	1681–1684	1655– 1668/69	1 son: Cao Paeng Moeng
31	Cao Paeng Moeng <sup>128</sup>	Dao Bianmeng	1684–1724	1670– 1697/98	2 sons: Tao Cin Pao; Tao Sao Wün
32	Tao Cin Pao	Dao Jinbao	1724–1729	1698–1707	1 son: Cao Thao Hu Nuak, a stammer

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> He was invested with the title, *Coti Nagara Maha Caiya Bòwòla Suthamma Laca*, and married a Burmese princess Nang Bua Kham, called Nang Suwanna Patumma Tewi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> As he was very young his mother, Nang Tewi, was the Regent.

					Wui Phin <sup>129</sup> ; 2) Tao Cao Thian <sup>130</sup> ; 3) Tao Cao 4) Paeng; Tao Suwan <sup>131</sup> ; 5) Tao Cao Saeng; 6) Tao Cao Cai <sup>132</sup>
34	Tao Wui Phin	Dao Weiping	1767–1777	1730–1745	1 son: Tao Yun Khò (Cao Fa Can) <sup>133</sup>
35	Tao Cao (Mòm) Suwan	Dao Shiwan	1777–1796	1746–1763	3 sons: Tao Thai Phin (Dao Taiping); Tao Thai Khò (Tao Taihe); Tao Thai Kang (Tao Taikang).
36	Tao Thai Khò, or Cao Mahawong	Dao Taihe	1797–1802	1764–1770	1 son: Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi)
37	Tao Yung Khò (Cao Fa Can) <sup>134</sup>	Dao Yonghe	_	1770–1779	Defected to Chiang Mai and died without an heir.
38	Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi) <sup>135</sup>	Dao Shengwu	1802–1833	-	

<sup>129</sup> He had a son called Tao Yung Khò (Cao Fa Can).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> He had two sons, Cao Maha Phom and Cao Mahakhanan. The Qing court prohibited them to be the *Saenwi Fa* of Sipsòng Panna. Cao Maha Phom had a son called Cao Maha Sang. Cao Mahakhannan had two sons, Cao Nò Kham and Cao Phom.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> He had three sons: 1) Tao Thai Phin (Cao Kumman); 2) Tao Thai Khò (Cao Mòm Mahawong), who had a son called Tao Sunwu (Cao Maha Nòi); 3) Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mahawang), who had two sons, Tao Coen Cong (Cao Suca Wanna) and Tao Soen Cong (Cao Lammawuttha).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> He had two sons, Cao Maha Phom and Cao Kha Tian.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> The Qing court prohibited him to be the *Saenwi Fa* of Sipsòng Panna.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Tao Yung Khò from Moeng Luang was the *Saenwi Fa* of the Burmese court, not the Qing court.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> He was the *Saenwi Fa* of the Qing court.

39	Tao Thai Khang (Cao Mòm Ma- hawang) <sup>136</sup>	Dao Taikang		1780–1785 (as regent) 1786–1809	2 sons: Tao Coeng Cong (Cao Suca Wanna) and Tao Soen Cong (Dao Chengzong) or Cao Lammawutthi <sup>137</sup> .
40	Tao Coen Cong (Cao Mòm Suca Wanna)	Dao Zhengzong	1834–1864	1788–1818	1 son: Cao Mòm Saeng (Tao Sin Fu) and adopted his nephew Tao Cin An (Cao Mò Sò).
41	Tao Cin An (Cao Mòm Sò or Cao Mòm Khung Kham) <sup>138</sup>	Dao Jun'an	_	1863–1879	3 sons: Cao Mòm Kham Lü (Tao Soen An); Cao Mòm Phomma; Cao Mòm Còm Moeng. <sup>139</sup>
42	Cao Mòm Saeng (Tao Sin Fu) <sup>140</sup>	Dao Taikang or Dao Bingfu	_	1880–1883	Died without a son.
43	Tao Soen An (Cao Mòm Kham Lü) <sup>141</sup>	Dao Cheng'en		1884–1924	9 sons: 1) Cao Mòm Suwanna Pha Khang (Dao Dongliang); 2) Cao Mòm Kang (Dao Donggang); 3) Cao Mòm Kham Cün (Dao Donghua); 4) Cao Mòm Còm Moeng (Moeng Tui); 5) Cao Mòm Khòng Kham (Dao Dongcai); 6) Cao Mòm Saeng Moeng (Dao Dongting); 7) Cao

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<sup>141</sup> He had eight wives and many sons and daughters.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> He was appointed the *Saenwi Fa* of the Burmese court and invested with the title, *Coti Nagara Maha Wongsa Laca*. At that time, Sipsòng Panna had two *Saenwi Fa*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> He had a son called Cao Mòm Khung Kham (Cao Mòm Sò), whose Chinese name was Tao Cin An (Dao Jun'an).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> He was killed by his cousin, Cao Mòm Saeng.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> The grew up in Chiang Tung under the protection of the Cao Fa after their father had been killed by their uncle, Cao Mòm Saeng.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> He was killed at Ban Sa in Chiang Rung by the lords of the *moeng* to the east of the Mekong River under the leadership of Moeng La. See Gao Lishi (1984), 41.2.

					Mòm Khung
					Kham (Dao
					Dongyu); 8) Cao
					Mòm Phomma
					(Dao Dongxin); 9)
					Cao Mòm Mani
					Kham (Dao
					Dongxin)
44	Tao Tung	Dao Dongliang	_	1927–1943	2 sons: Cao Mòm
	Laeng (Cao				In (Dao Shide);
	Mòm Suwanna				Cao Mòm
	Pha Khang)				Mahaxai (Dao
					Shigui). Adopted
					his nephew, Cao
					Mòm Kham Lü
					(Dao Shixun) <sup>142</sup>
45	Tao Sü Sin	Dao Shixun	_	1947–1950	
	(Cao Mòm				
	Kham Lü) <sup>143</sup>				

<sup>142</sup> Dao Shixun (Tao Sü Sin) is the son of Dao Dongliang number 6 brother Cao Mòm Saeng Moeng (Dao Dongting).

He ruled over a year before Sipsòng Panna was liberated. In 1953 an autonomous sub-prefecture was established there. Cao Mòm Kham Lü, who is known in China by his Chinese name Dao Shixun, is living in Kunming, Yunnan.

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## BOOK REVIEWS1

Ashin Kunsal Kassapa (trans). *Wonders of Mebegon Village*. Nagamasa Centre, Thailand & www.upagote.net. 2005 xiv + 144pp + Glossary 12. Colour photographs. ISBN 974-93652-8-3

The narrative of this book begins in the Minbu area of central Burma in 1952. Spiritual guides, long since passed from the present life, arrived to speak and teach mindfulness through the medium of living people. These particular wizzars, "accomplished masters," were location specific, coming from Nagama Mountain, a place accessible only to the adept, west of Minbu. A key focus of this "dhatsii-ing," channelling, was Htun Yin, described as a simple, penniless man. Hoping to get a cure for a stomach ailment, he had met a monk and a person in white robes, wizzars as it turned out, who offered him a cure if he would agree to help propagate the teachings of Buddha by letting them use him as a medium. Some "fragrant and tasty" medicine restored him to health. Several days later at his home village of Mebegon, a few kilometres north of Minbu, he delivered his first talk, in which the wizzar explained to the assembled villagers "Htun Yin is like a radio and I am like a broadcasting station." At subsequent gatherings rosary beads floated in the air, fruit and statues appeared from nowhere. The wizzars at times appeared in person under circumstances that mystified all present.

Htun Yin reportedly went for several years eating nothing but "fruit and an occasional cup of coffee" provided by the *wizzars*. In 1973 he left his family and was ordained a monk with the religious name U Tillaw Keinda. His devotees built him a monastery. In 1975, and again in 1989, complex "transformation by fire" ceremonies were held in "manmade caves of victory" at the Mebegon monastery to further prolong the lives of two of the visiting *wizzars*, U Pandita, a monk born in AD 1256, who had already prolonged his life by alchemy, and U Uttamakyaw, born in AD 1453, who had prolonged his life by a knowledge of magical diagrams. The monastery continues to draw devotees and pilgrims.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Views, opinions, and other content of the book reviews are those of the individual reviewers only and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor, the editorial board, or the international advisory board of the *SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research* or of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

This account in English of a contemporary *wizzar* cult has been translated from Burmese and edited by a Spanish-born Buddhist monk. It is a sometimes loosely-linked compilation, comprising hagiographies of three *wizzars*, a biography of the medium through whom they speak, testimonials from devotees and a glossary. Its value is increased by the amount of detail provided: lists of participants in ceremonies, the prayers recited, the quantities of ingredients and offerings, the timing of rituals. We learn that much of the activity, including mysterious appearances and disappearances of *wizzars* and sometimes of their medium, takes place at night. We are told that the medium, U Tillaw Keinda, has in the past exhibited eccentric behaviour, attracted attempts at exorcism, and been jailed, as recently as 2004, following "nonsensical accusations." The book tellingly emphasises that the *wizzars* never talk about politics or criticise the government.

At times the detail approaches the superfluous, or the narrative loses focus. Someone arrives uninvited at a ceremony in a Nissan car: we search in vain for the consequences and significance of this. But the description of the cult, the presentation of practices that are admitted to be outside the beliefs of "some orthodox Theravada practitioners," is generally coherent in itself. *Wonders of Mebegon Village* is particularly significant as an anthropological and religious source because it provides material for comparison with the better-known cult activities centred around Bo Mingaung at the *wizzar* shrine complexes at Amarapura and Mount Popa, which E. Michael Mendelson introduced to English readers in the 1960s.

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Terance W. Bigalke. *Tana Toraja: a Social History of an Indonesian People*. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 2005. xxviii +395 pp. Maps, Illustrations, Notes, Index. ISBN 9971-69-313-5.

For a student of Burmese history, the value of this book is comparative, as it focuses on an upland people in tension with dominant lowlanders. Actively encouraged by Dutch policies of 'divide and rule,' the Toraja of

the highlands of South Sulawesi largely went over to Protestant Christianity from the era of high colonialism, although minorities clung to Animism, or converted to the Islam of the Bugis lowlands, or plumped for Roman Catholicism. Japanese invaders in 1942-45 tried to play both the Christian and the Muslim card. While Indonesian political and social movements were active in the Toraja highlands, separatist tendencies unsurprisingly emerged after independence. Replacing Islam with Theravada Buddhism, the parallels with Burmese situations are clear. There remain major differences, however, for example the remarkable prevalence of slavery and slave exports among the precolonial Toraja. Furthermore, although tensions between uplands and lowlands occasionally boiled over into violence after independence, they did not give rise to the long-running guerrilla campaigns characteristic of Burma.

The book derives from a 1981 University of Wisconsin thesis, which has been widely influential and much cited (including by the present reviewer), and chapters 2 and 5 have already been substantially published elsewhere. Despite additional fieldwork in 1986, and some revision of the text, there is a dated feel to this text. It emerges from ideas, current in the 1970s, about 'trade and politics,' religious conversion, and education. To take just one example, Bigalke provides rich material on the growth of coffee as a cash crop, but hardly considers the extent of local consumption of coffee, its possible cultural meanings in relation to religious conversion, and its potential ability to replace betel-chewing. The first mention of local coffee production is buried deep in a footnote on page 339. Bigalke has also relied heavily, and at times rather uncritically, on oral traditions and testimony, in ways that might not be as widely accepted today. Finally, there is no proper conclusion to the volume. That said, it is very useful to have this thesis finally published after so many years. This is a service to the international scholarly community for which Singapore University Press should be congratulated.

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## DISSERTATIONS

Civil-Military Relations in Ne Win's Burma, 1962-1988
(Ne Win Taisei-Ki Biruma ni Okeru Sei-Gun Kankei (1962-1988))

ネー・ウィン体制期ビルマにおける政軍関係 (1962-1988)

Yoshihiro Nakanishi Kyoto University March 2007

This dissertation aims to describe the transformation of civil-military relations from 1962 to 1988 in Burma, focusing on Gen. Ne Win's leadership and the bureaucratic development of the military (tatmadaw). The author argues that wide-ranging distribution of state posts to the relatively small-sized officer corps is the most important factor for the military regime durability in Burma. It enabled Ne Win to maintain his power for 26 years and tatmadaw to exercise powerful influence on other political actors. In order to demonstrate this point, the author examines how the formal and informal networks of the officer corps expanded to other state organizations under Ne Win's project of party-state building. The author's argument is largely based on primary sources of the archives in Burma and interviews with former military and party officers.

The study consists of four main parts. The first part deals with the state ideology formation. Previous studies have analyzed the state ideology of Ne Win regime from the perspective of Burma nationalism. The author reexamines the conventional views by focusing on the interaction between the personal history of U Chit Hlaing, the drafter of the ideology, and the military politics in the 1950s. It demonstrates that some anti-communistic and pro-constitutional propaganda articles became the state ideology after the coup d'état on March 2nd 1962, which denied the 1947 Constitution and legitimated the political intervention by *tatmadaw*. The second part is an analysis of the relationship between the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and *tatmadaw*. Based on detailed empirical investigations into personnel

management of BSPP, the author traces the process that Ne Win attempted to build a party-state since 1962 and finally failed in 1977. It concludes that Ne Win's state reformation resulted in a party-state manqué (=failed). The third part looks into the impact of party-state building on the civil bureaucracy. It shows that the administrative reformation in the middle of the 1970s created the basic patterns of the transfer of the military officers to the central and local administrative organizations. The author explains the weakness of bureaucrats or technocrats in Ne Win's Burma compared with the contemporary military regimes in Thailand and Indonesia. The forth part provides an explanation to Ne Win's leadership and tatmadaw transformation. It challenges the monolithic image of Ne Win-tatmadav relations, and shows the detailed process of development of tatmadaw. The author argues that the control of tatmadaw was essential to Ne Win's power maintenance and the limitation of his control over tatmadaw led to the coup d'état on September 18th 1988.

The thesis concludes that Ne Win's leadership was characterized by the dilemmas between his strong intention for the political "revolution" (tohlanyei) and his weak power base in other organizations except tatmadaw. His strong intention enabled him to embark on building a party-state. However, his project was not completed as a result of his weak power base. This attempt and failure of party-state building hindered civilian institutions from developing on one hand, and on the other hand it institutionalized tatmadaw intervention into every field of the government. Consequently, tatmadaw became the powerful political actor in Burma and created the basic mechanism for the interest coordination in accordance with the military hierarchy.

# Burmese Buddhist Imagery of the Early Bagan Period (1044-1113)

Charlotte Kendrick Galloway The Australian National University 2007

Buddhism is an integral part of Burmese culture. While Buddhism has been practiced in Burma for around 1500 years and evidence of the

religion is found throughout the country, nothing surpasses the concentration of Buddhist monuments found at Bagan. Bagan represents not only the beginnings of a unified Burmese country, but also symbolises Burmese 'ownership' of Theravada Buddhism. While there is an abundance of artistic material throughout Burma, the study of Burmese Buddhist art by western scholars remains in it infancy due to historical events. In recent years, opportunities for further research have increased, and Bagan, as the region of Buddhism's principal flowering in Burma, is the starting point for the study of Burmese Buddhist art. To date, there has been no systematic review of the stylistic or iconographic characteristics of the Buddhist images of this period. This thesis proposes, for the first time, a chronological framework for sculptural depictions of the Buddha, and identifies the characteristics of Buddha images for each identified phase. The framework and features identified should provide a valuable resource for the dating of future discoveries of Buddhist sculpture at Bagan. As epigraphic material from this period is very scant, the reconstruction of Bagan's history has relied heavily to this point in time on non-contemporaneous accounts from Burma, and foreign chronicles. The usefulness of Bagan's visual material in broadening our understanding of the early Bagan period has been largely overlooked. This is addressed by relating the identified stylistic trends with purported historical events and it is demonstrated that, in the absence of other contemporaneous material, visual imagery is a valid and valuable resource for both supporting and refuting historical events. Buddhist imagery of Bagan widely regarded to represent the beginnings of 'pure' Theravada practice that King Anawrahta, the first Burman ruler, actively encouraged. This simplistic view has limited the potential of the imagery to provide a greater understanding of Buddhist practice at Bagan, and subsequently, the cross-cultural interactions that may have been occurring. In this light the narrative sculptural imagery of the period is interrogated against the principal Mahayana and Theravada texts relating to the life of Gotama Buddha. This review, along with the discussion regarding potential agencies for stylistic change, reveals that during the early Bagan period, Buddhism was an eclectic mix of both Theravada and Mahayana, which integrated with pre-existing spiritual traditions. Towards the end of the early Bagan period, trends were emerging which would lead to a distinctly Burmese form of Buddhist practice and visual expression.

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